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ABSTRACT 
Ensuring vaccine affordability and accessibility are major challenges for the fulfillment of the 
immunization goals of the Global Vaccine Action Plan for the decade 2011 – 2020. Four of the 
five immunization goals in this plan are currently delayed because of limitations in vaccine 
affordability. The use of combination vaccines can help to make vaccines more accessible as long 
as their pricing becomes more affordable. Procurement mechanisms, such as tiered pricing and 
pooled procurement, have generally been used for reducing the cost of vaccine purchases, but they 
have not been used to ensure overall market affordability. This study extends the Antigen Bundle 
Pricing Problem to analyze a coordinated vaccine market and understand the effects on vaccine 
affordability of three factors:  uncertainty regarding vaccine reservation prices, number of market 
segments in which customers are grouped, and the interest rate at which manufacturers recover 
their investment. Experimental results show that increasing the number of market segments, in 
which countries are grouped, positively influences vaccine affordability but reduces overall profit 
for manufactures. This study proposes strategies to mitigate the impact to manufacturers by 
determining the optimal market segmentation of target countries while considering limited access 
to external funding. 
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NOTATION 
HIC High Income Countries 
UMIC Upper Middle Income Countries 
LMIC Lower Middle Income Countries 
LIC Low Income Countries 
N Non-target group of countries (HIC + UMIC) 
T Target group of countries (LMIC + LIC) 
GNI Gross National Income  
LGNIMS Lowest GNI Market Segment 
HGNIMS 
MARR 
Highest GNI Market Segment 
Minimum Attractive Rate of Return 
n Reservation price uncertainty factor 
m Number of market segments factor 
i Interest rate (also called MARR) factor 
MV Market Value 
CST Customer Surplus for T 
CSN Customer Surplus for N 
COSTT Procurement cost for T 
COSTN Procurement cost for N 
TP Total Profit 
TA Total Annuities 
R&D Research and Development 
ROI Return on Investment 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Only after access to safe drinking water, vaccines are considered the most important public 
health intervention to reduce mortality due to infectious diseases [1],[2]⁠.  The eradication of 
smallpox in 1980, the significant reduction in the number of poliomyelitis cases, whooping cough, 
diphtheria and tetanus cases, and the morbidity reduction due to vaccine–preventable diseases in 
industrialized countries are examples of the effectiveness of vaccination [1], [3], [4]⁠. Due to their 
importance, vaccines have direct and indirect effects on all the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) that aim to mitigate global poverty [5], [6]⁠. 
Despite of the importance of vaccines, their affordability and access still need to be improved. 
Globally, nearly 21.8 million children under one year of age around the world still do not receive 
three doses against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP3) [7]⁠. High vaccine costs are among 
the main reasons affecting vaccine availability in low and middle income countries, leading to 
unvaccinated or under vaccinated children [8], [9]⁠⁠. In fact, since 2001, the immunization cost for 
a child has increased 68 times in the poorest countries [10]⁠. Additionally, the Global Vaccine 
Action Plan (GVAP), an international effort to ensure global vaccine access, reports that 4 of the 
5 immunization goals for the decade 2011 – 2020 have been missed due to limited vaccine 
affordability and poor access [11]. 
Issues limiting vaccine accessibility and affordability pose challenges to high, middle, and low 
income countries, as well as to manufacturers. High vaccine prices restrict immunization coverage 
for low and middle income countries. Low vaccine access makes it difficult for manufacturers to 
recuperate high research and development cost investment, which then results in higher price per 
dose for vaccines in high income countries [12]. Excessive costs per dose can make vaccines so 
unattractive that their production may become unsustainable [13]. 
Combination vaccines offer multiple antigens in a single shot and provide an opportunity to 
increase accessibility that is key to achieve global immunization targets; they can also alleviate the 
logistics problems associated with multiple vaccinations by reducing the need for multiple visits 
to ensure full immunization. The benefits of using combination vaccines are extremely important 
for developing countries, where distances to access medical centers and the lack of infrastructure 
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make the logistics of vaccination expensive. Clearly, by reducing the number of injections for 
ensuring full immunization, the need of multiple visits, and the likelihood of missed doses decrease 
⁠[8],⁠[9]⁠⁠. 
The choice of procurement mechanisms is key for making vaccines more accessible through 
pricing.  Traditionally vaccine manufacturers have relied on tiered pricing as their mechanism of 
choice to place vaccines in different markets, whereas buyers have relied on pool procurement to 
improve their negotiating leverage. It is important to note that both mechanisms are not exclusive 
and that they co-exist in the vaccine market. 
In tiered pricing manufacturers sell vaccines at different prices depending on the markets' 
ability or willingness to pay. The willingness-to-pay corresponds to the maximum price that a 
market may commit to pay for a vaccine dose [14]⁠. Manufacturers have generally estimated this 
willingness to pay (also called reservation price) as a function of the market's Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita and offered vaccines at different prices accordingly [15]⁠. For instance, 
GlaxoSmithKline, one of the largest vaccine manufacturers, offers rotavirus vaccines to GAVI-
eligible countries (poorest countries) at $2.50 with a 95% reduction in price compared to high 
income countries [16]⁠. However, GNI-based tiered pricing does not necessarily strengthen vaccine 
affordability [17], in part because of the difficulty to quantify what willingness-to-pay is and how 
to measure it. Establishing a monetary value for the health benefits of vaccines is not only a 
function of the GNI. This monetary value of a vaccine is a function of the severity of the diseases 
the vaccine targets, the diseases' public perception and concern, and the existence of treatment 
alternatives for those diseases. Quantifying all these factors is highly complex and subjective. 
In pooled procurement, the reduction of vaccine prices is obtained by aggregating various 
countries' demands, achieving economies of scale and improving collective purchasing and 
negotiating power. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) are international entities that practice pooled procurement in the 
vaccine market. The PAHO's Revolving Fund purchases vaccines on behalf of 41 nations in the 
Americas and the Caribbean [18], [19]⁠. The UNICEF Supply Division also purchases vaccines for 
the poorest countries in a pooled procurement system, including GAVI-eligible countries (with 
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GNI per capita less than $1045.00), mainly with the financial support of donors and in a multi-
year arrangement scheme [18]⁠. 
Figure 1 illustrates a depiction of the current vaccine market. In the tiered pricing strategy, 
countries are grouped based on their GNI per capita into four market segments: High Income 
Countries (HIC), Upper Middle Income Countries (UMIC), Lower Middle Income Countries 
(LMIC) and Low Income Countries (LIC). By using this segmentation, manufacturers can 
establish vaccine prices either through direct negotiation with each country or through the 
intervention of international organizations (PAHO, UNICEF) that use a pooled procurement 
strategy for price negotiation. This study considers that Lower Middle Income Countries and Low 
Income Countries are the main target of increasing vaccine affordability and will be referred to as 
the Target group of countries (T); countries in the High Income and Upper Middle Income groups 
will be referred to as the non-target group of countries (N). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Current situation of the vaccine market. 
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This study considers a hypothetical vaccine market in which a monopsonistic entity provides 
procurement decisions that facilitate the implementation of a coordinated procurement system, in 
which pooled procurement and tiered-pricing are implemented. This study aims to understand the 
effect on vaccine affordability and accessibility due to (1) uncertain vaccine reservations prices, 
(2) a changing number of vaccine market segments, and (3) the interest rate at which vaccine 
manufacturers recover their investment (MARR). Additionally, this study extends the ABP model 
defined by Proano et al. [14]⁠, in which the vaccine market consists of three key players: 
manufacturers, buyers, and a monopsonistic entity. The monopsonistic entity ensures that 
procurement plans maximize profit for the manufacturers, as well as savings for the buying 
countries in order to facilitate a sustainable vaccine market in which combination vaccines are 
simultaneously affordable and profitable. Particularly, we extend Proano's model by considering 
that the reservation prices for each vaccine are stochastic and the number and configuration of 
market segments can be varied. Finally, to support the analysis proposed in this study, a 
comprehensive data set of vaccine pricing was generated by fusing data from multiple sources. 
These generated secondary data facilitate the estimation of the different vaccine reservation prices 
in different countries as they are grouped in different market segments. 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review 
on tiered pricing, vaccine procurement, vaccine pricing and the ABP problem proposed by Proano 
et al. [14]. Chapter 3 explains the overall methodology whereas Chapter 4 describes the secondary 
data to estimate reservation prices. Chapter 5 provides experimental results and discusses the 
strategies to increase affordability. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and extensions of 
this study.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Significant criticism about GNI–based tiered pricing is changing the way market tiers are 
determined, and currently, there is no straightforward, equitable way to set vaccine tiered prices to 
ensure affordability [10], [17]⁠. Moon et al. [17] claim that under GNI–based tiered pricing, 
wealthier markets become the center of attention for manufacturers since most Market Value 
derives from sales in wealthier markets while the immunization needs of lower-income markets 
are unattractive (e.g. malaria vaccine [20]). Additionally, Moon et al. [17] claims that GNI-tier 
pricing also fails to account for the different levels of inequity and disparity existing within each 
country.  
GNI-based tiered pricing also affects middle income countries' ability to access new more 
expensive vaccines. In fact, middle income countries introduce new vaccines after GAVI-eligible 
countries or high income countries do. For instance, while 78% of the low income countries will 
incorporate PCV vaccine (Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine)  in their immunization program by 
2016, only 56% of the middle income countries will do [10]⁠. These GNI-based tiered pricing 
disadvantages have led manufacturers to consider additional countries’ characteristics to determine 
vaccine prices, yet the actual details of how manufacturers price vaccines remain confidential [21]⁠. 
For example, in addition to GNI per capita , GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) considers the willingness to 
invest on immunization, the length of the vaccination program, the coverage of the target 
population, the government’s commitment to vaccinate catch-up cohorts, and the number of doses 
to be purchased when pricing its vaccines [22]. 
Ideally, a vaccine market must offer affordable vaccines and provide incentives for 
manufacturers to be willing to invest in research and development of new products. Therefore, 
vaccine pricing must ensure availability for buyers and incentives for manufacturers to remain in 
the market. 
Economic approaches for vaccine procurement and pricing focus on cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether the introduction of a vaccine in an immunization system is justified. However, 
quantifying all the health and societal benefits of vaccines is challenging and highly subjective 
[23]⁠,[24],[25]⁠. Typically, the potential value of a vaccine is quantified prior to the beginning of its 
initial development stages based on the cost benefit analysis of the anticipated benefits of having 
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the vaccine using QALYs (Quality – Adjusted Life Years) [26]. However, there are many 
subjective and ethical assumptions underlying the use of QALYs for establishing the monetary 
value of a life [27]. Similarly, Lee and McGlone [28] claim that new vaccines should be valued in 
advance and support the idea that pricing should vary depending on purchase volume and location.  
Operations Research models have also been used for vaccine procurement. Jacobson et al. [29] 
proposed a mathematical model for vaccine procurement motivated by an immunization schedule 
that could be fulfilled with different formularies (e.g. sets of vaccines that are part of the 
Recommended Immunization Schedule). The model determines which vaccines should be part of 
the most economical formulary that satisfies the immunization schedule. Weniger et al. [30] 
describes an economic algorithm for vaccine procurement using Jacobson's model to find the 
lowest cost formulary that minimizes the overall cost of vaccination (e.g. considering direct and 
indirect costs of vaccination). Subsequent studies use this algorithm for: determining maximum 
vaccine prices so that those vaccines are part of the lowest cost formulary (inclusion prices) [31], 
analyzing and comparing the economic value of combination vaccines [32],[33],[34], and 
evaluating the economic value for future combination vaccines by creating inclusion price 
distributions [35]⁠. Aligned with those studies, Hall et al. [36] propose the General Minimum Cost 
Vaccine Selection problem, which determines the lowest cost formulary by minimizing the cost of 
under-immunization and over-immunization. A different approach, using game theory, is proposed 
by Robbins et al. [37] to determine the equilibrium prices that vaccines should have to share the 
market by volume. Robbins et al. [37] propose the Weighted Set Covering Optimization Problem 
to analyze the vaccine market under a Bertrand competition model, where manufacturers set prices 
and consumers buy quantities according to those prices. Then, manufacturers could agree on the 
share of the market by volume by establishing the price of vaccines accordingly. The objective in 
this model is to minimize the weighted sum of vaccination costs subject to the completion of the 
elements in the immunization schedule. 
Particularly, two Operation Research studies consider the need to have a vaccine market that 
strengthens suppliers and buyers simultaneously for vaccine procurement, yet both of them have 
different approaches to deal with the need of a sustainable vaccine market. Robbins and Jacobson 
[38] proposed the Monopsonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing and Purchasing Problem (MVF3P), 
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which minimizes the cost of providing immunization while ensuring a specific profit for vaccine 
producers as an incentive to remain in the market. In the MVF3P there is a monopsonist entity that 
procures vaccines for a birth cohort in a period of time, considering different immunization 
formularies that individually could satisfy the immunization schedule. The outputs of the model 
are the prices at which vaccines should be negotiated, the number of children that use a specific 
formulary, and the periods at which immunizations should happen. The model unfortunately 
requires inaccessible manufacturing information such as the unit production cost per vaccine and 
the desired profit margin. It also assumes that the cost of administering a vaccine is deterministic 
and is restricted to transactions with only one purchaser. The other study is developed by Proano 
et al. [14] (first presented by Proano in [39]⁠) proposes the Antigen Bundle Pricing problem (ABP) 
to simultaneously maximize the savings and profit for vaccine buyers and producers, respectively. 
The ABP was designed assuming a hypothetical vaccine market that follows a coordinated 
procurement system where a monopsonistic entity interacts between buyers and producers to 
facilitate the negotiation of affordable and sustainable vaccine prices. The ABP determines the 
optimal procurement quantities, feasible negotiation price ranges for vaccines, and the production 
plan for each manufacturer that will maximize total social surplus. Likewise, the ABP requires 
information about manufacturers that is not easily accessible such as the supply capacity per 
vaccine and the value of annuities necessary to recover research and development investment, as 
well as information about the buyers' willingness to pay for vaccines (reservation price), which are 
treated as deterministic parameters. However, the ABP design provides important advantages for 
the purposes of this study. The global perspective of the vaccine market is one of them as the 
interests of multiple producers and buyers can be simultaneously considered. Another critical 
advantage is the possibility to easily emulate tiered pricing. Finally, the ABP design fosters the 
use of combination vaccines whenever possible, transferring the benefits of combination vaccines 
to all market segments. 
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2.1 Description of the ABP and SABP framework 
 The ABP considers vaccines as bundles of antigens that are offered in a vaccine market that 
consists of a set of buyers that require immunization for a specific number of children, a set of 
manufacturers that meet the immunization needs through bundles of antigens, and a monopsonistic 
entity that facilitates the negotiation between them. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
monopsonistic entity negotiates vaccine prices with manufacturers, considering the market 
segments' willingness to pay (reservation prices) and ensuring profit for manufacturers. Moreover, 
market segments receive complete immunization at prices equal to or below their reservation 
prices while vaccine manufacturers recover their investment in R&D for a given bundle through 
annuities that ensure a given return on investment (ROI). The ABP then determines the number of 
bundle doses that are procured by each market segment from each manufacturer, the price range 
at which this bundle could be negotiated, and the manufacturers' production plan that maximizes 
savings for market segments and profits for manufacturers subject to the following constraints. (1) 
The savings from procuring a vaccine (or bundle) must be larger than the sum of the savings of 
any combination of bundles that could provide equivalent antigen protection. (2) The antigen 
demand is satisfied for all market segments. (3) The supply capacity is given and cannot be 
exceeded. (4) Return on investment from manufacturers is required and is paid through annuities 
from vaccine sales. (5) Tiered pricing is enforced across market segments which ensures that prices 
of any given bundle are monotonically increasing for markets with increasing income. (6) Market 
segments' reservations prices cannot be exceeded.  
This study proposes the Stochastic Antigen Bundle Pricing problem (SABP) which is 
described in detail in the following section, the SABP considers a vaccine market where 
reservation prices for vaccines in each market are stochastic. To solve the SABP, we rely on a 
Monte Carlo simulation approach to solve problem instances with randomly generated reservation 
prices. Each of such instances is considered deterministic and solved using the ABP. 
 
9 
 
Figure 2 – Hypothetical coordinated vaccine market 
 
2.2 Mathematical formulation of the Stochastic Antigen Bundle Pricing (SABP) problem 
[14]. 
The objective function of the SABP is to maximize the expected value of the Total Social 
Surplus (E[TSS]) by adding the expected Total Profit (E[TP]) and the expected Total Customer 
Surplus (E[TCS]) that manufacturers and buyers receive respectively.  
 
Sets: 
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𝐵2(𝑝) bundles manufactured by producer 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝐵2(𝑝) ⊆ 𝐵 
𝑁(𝑏, 𝑝) subset of bundles in 𝐵2(𝑝) that, when combined with each other, supply an  
               equivalent antigen offering to that provided by bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 
𝑄(𝑏, 𝑝) set of all possible subset of bundles 𝑁(𝑏, 𝑝)for 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 
 
Parameters: 
𝑅𝑏𝑚(𝜉) uncertain reservation price of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 in market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 that follows  
                 a probability distribution function 𝜉 
λ𝑚 average number of children born per year in market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝐶𝑏𝑝 capital-recovery annuity for the production-development cost of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵    
                when manufactured by vaccine producer 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 
𝑑𝑎𝑚 number of doses of antigen 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 required to provide full immunization to a child  
                in market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝐷𝑏𝑚 maximum number of doses of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 that could be administered to a child in  
                market 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 to avoid over immunization (𝐷𝑏𝑚 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑑𝑎𝑚: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴1(𝑏)})  
𝑆𝑏𝑚 maximum number of doses of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 that can be produced by manufacturer  
               𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 
δ scaling constant used to model vaccine demand elasticity 
𝑃𝑏𝑚           estimated baseline price of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵in market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝑛            percentage of 𝑃𝑏𝑚 
 
Variables: 
𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 number of doses of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, supplied by vaccine producer 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, offered to 
 market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝 price per dose of bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, supplied bu vaccine producer 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, offered to 
 market segment 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
γ𝑏𝑝 binary variable taking value of 1 if bundle 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 is manufactured by vaccine 
 producer 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 and 0 otherwise 
 
TSS, TP and TCS are defined by: 
 
𝑇𝑆𝑆 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑏𝑚
𝑚∈𝑀𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
(ξ)𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑏𝑝
𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
γ𝑏𝑝 
𝑇𝑃 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝
𝑚∈𝑀𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑏𝑝
𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
γ𝑏𝑝 
𝑇𝐶𝑆 = ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ) − 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝)
𝑚∈𝑀𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 
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The SABP mathematical model is: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: E [∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ)𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝
𝑚∈𝑀𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑏𝑝γ𝑏𝑝
𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
] 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡to: 
 
(𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ) − 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝)γ𝑏𝑝 ⩾ ( ∑ (𝑅𝑡𝑚(ξ) − 𝑌𝑡𝑚𝑝)
𝑡∈𝑁(𝑏,𝑝)
) γ𝑏𝑝 
           ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑁(𝑏, 𝑝) ⊆ 𝑄(𝑏, 𝑝) 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝
𝑏∈𝐵1(𝑎)∩𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
= 𝑑𝑎𝑚λ𝑚                         ,𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
∑ 𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝
𝑚∈𝑀
⩽ γ𝑏𝑝𝑆𝑏𝑝                                               ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝) 
∑ 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝
𝑚∈𝑀
⩾ γ𝑏𝑝𝐶𝑏𝑝                                      ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝) 
𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 ⩽ 𝐷𝑏𝑚λ𝑚 (1 − (
𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝
δ𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ)
)
ϕ
)                  ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝 ⩾ 𝑌𝑏𝑛𝑝                                                             ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 ∧ 𝑅𝑏𝑚 ⩾ 𝑅𝑏𝑛 
0 ≤ 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝 ≤ 𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ)                                               ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵𝑤(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝 ≥ 0                                                                 ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
γ𝑏𝑝 = {0,1}                                                             ,𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝) 
𝑅𝑏𝑚(ξ)~𝑈[𝑃𝑏𝑚, (1 + 𝑛)𝑃𝑏𝑚]                              ,𝑏 ∈ 𝐵2(𝑝), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀
12 
3. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTATION 
This study aims to understand the effects on vaccine affordability of three factors: (1) the 
reservation price uncertainty, (2) the number of market segments in which countries can be 
grouped, and (3) the interest rate at which manufacturers recover their investment. The effects of 
these three factors are analyzed by integrating a Monte Carlo Simulation within an experimental 
design. Scenarios for each factor are determined and for each combination of scenarios a set of 
randomly simulated instances are created. Each instance represents a realization of reservation 
prices for all vaccines. This process is shown in Figure 3. The factors, metrics, statistical tools and 
data used in this study are explained in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Experimental process 
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3.1 Metrics 
Four metrics are defined to observe the expected economic participation of vaccine buyers and 
manufacturers under different level values of the factors of interest so that the change in 
affordability can be observed. An improved affordability for the countries in the target group is 
achieved if after changing the conditions of the market (by changing the value of the factors), their 
savings increase, which simultaneously means that their procurement costs are reduced. These 
savings result from the opportunity of purchasing vaccines at prices lower than their randomly 
generated reservation prices. The metrics of interest are defined relative to the definition of the 
Market Value (MV), which is defined as the maximum amount of money available for vaccine 
procurement from all buyers, or the dollar amount available to buy vaccines at reservation prices.  
Since the reservation prices are uncertain, the Market Value is also uncertain and changes for 
each simulated instance. Hence, the need to use metrics defined with respect to the Market Value 
of each simulated instance. These metrics can then be considered as portions of the Market Value. 
The metrics are the Customer Surplus for the Target group of countries, the Customer Surplus for 
the Non-target group of countries, the Total Profit and the Total Annuities for manufacturers, all 
of them divided by the Market Value. A representation of these metrics is shown in Figure 4 and 
the derivation of these components are explained next. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Metrics of the vaccine market with respect to the Market Value 
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The Total Social Surplus is the result after aggregating the profits and customer surplus from 
manufacturers and buyers respectively (Total Social Surplus = Total Profit + Total Customer 
Surplus). Additionally, the Total Social Surplus is the dollar amount of buying vaccines at 
reservation price, or the Market Value, minus the sum of the annual fixed payments that 
manufacturers would receive to recuperate R&D costs per procurement period (Total Social 
Surplus = Market Value – Total Annuities) [14].  
Therefore, 
𝑇𝑆𝑆 =  𝑀𝑉 − 𝑇𝐴 = 𝑇𝐶𝑆 + 𝑇𝑃 (1) 
Where: 
TSS  → Total Social Surplus 
MV  → Market Value 
TA   → Total Annuities 
TCS  → Total Customer Surplus 
TP  → Total Profit 
Rearranging (1), 
𝑀𝑉 = 𝑇𝐶𝑆 + 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝐴 (2) 
The Total Customer Surplus in (2) represents the sum of the savings that the Target (T) and 
Non-target (N) groups of countries have. After isolating the savings of each group (𝑇𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑇 +
𝐶𝑆𝑁, Refer to Appendix A for the mathematical expressions), the four components of the Market 
Value are expressed by: 
𝑀𝑉 = 𝐶𝑆𝑇 + 𝐶𝑆𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝐴 (3) 
Mathematical expressions for 𝐶𝑆𝑇 and 𝐶𝑆𝑁 can be found in Appendix A. Dividing (3) by the 
Market Value (MV), the metrics or components of the Market Value are: 
𝑀𝑉
𝑀𝑉
=
𝐶𝑆𝑇
𝑀𝑉
+
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝑀𝑉
+  
𝑇𝑃
𝑀𝑉
+
𝐴
𝑀𝑉
 
(4) 
 
By using expression (4), the economic participation of the target group, non-target group and 
manufacturers can be measured and compared across all instances of the simulation. The results 
will refer to the expected values of these metrics after running all the instances of the 
experimentation. 
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3.2 Factors 
The factors of interest of this study are reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and interest rate (i). These factors are described in the following subsections. 
3.2.1 Reservation price uncertainty (n) 
To evaluate the incidence of different reservation prices, it is assumed that reservation prices 
are unknown for every vaccine in a market, but their true value oscillates within a range above the 
estimated vaccine baseline price 𝑃𝑏𝑚. In particular, 𝑃𝑏𝑚 ≤ 𝑅𝑏𝑚 ≤ 𝑃𝑏𝑚(1 + 𝑛), where n is a 
percentage. Reservation prices are then assumed to follow a uniform distribution that is a function 
of 𝑃𝑏𝑚 and n such that 𝑅𝑏𝑚~𝑈[𝑃𝑏𝑚, 𝑃𝑏𝑚(1 + 𝑛)]. The procedure to estimate 𝑃𝑏𝑚 is explained in 
Chapter 4 while the values that n can take are: 5, 10, 15 and 20 % above 𝑃𝑏𝑚. For example, if a 
vaccine baseline price is $10.00, then for n = 5%, $10.00 ≤ 𝑅𝑏𝑚 ≤ $10.50. The reservation price 
uncertainty is represented in Figure 5a and examples and the levels of this factor are provided in 
Figure 5b. The methods used to estimate 𝑃𝑏𝑚 are explained thoroughly in chapter 4. 
 
Figure 5 – Reservation Price Uncertainty, a) Reservation price uncertainty factor (n), b) levels of 
reservation price uncertainty. 
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3.2.2 Number of market segments (m) 
To explore the effect of different market segment configurations for the target group of 
countries, Figure 6 describes four experimental scenarios showing the vaccine market countries 
clustered in 2, 4, 8 and 12 market segments. Figure 6 also shows how countries in the target group 
(T) are distributed among the market segments of each scenario. 
 
Figure 6 – Number of market segments factor 
 
3.2.3 Annual Interest Rate (i) 
The change in the annual interest rate factor affects the amount of annuities, which are defined 
as a set of equal payments at the end of all the periods considered in the timeframe of an investment 
[40]. Annuities are illustrated in Figure 7 and their values are calculated considering a given 
investment P, the interest rate and the number of years to recuperate the investment. The interest 
rate is also referred to as the Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return (MARR) for R&D and to 
evaluate the incidence of annuities in affordability four levels were evaluated: 5, 10, 15 and 20 % 
while the timeframe for the investment is 20 years. Additionally, R&D costs are assumed to 
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correspond to the manufacturers’ investment. Values for R&D costs for each vaccine and annuities 
are described in section 3.4.1.  
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Figure 7 – Cash flow diagram for R&D costs of vaccines and annuities. (Do not confuse the 
definition of n → number of years in this subsection with the factor reservation price uncertainty) 
3.2.4 Summary of factors 
Table 1 summarizes the three factors with their respective units, notation and factor levels.  
Table 1 – Factors and levels considered in the experimental design 
Factor Unit Notation Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Reservation price uncertainty [%] n 5 10 15 20 
Number of market segments  [units] m 2 4 8 12 
Interest Rate  [%] i 5 10 15 20 
 
3.3 Statistical tools  
The values of the metrics are used to determine the significance of the factors through analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) and Kruskal - Wallis test although additional statistical tests and feasibility 
analyses were used to support its results. ANOVA provided significance of the factors, but in some 
cases, two of the four assumptions to fully validate its results were violated. The first one is that 
the residuals deviated from the normal distribution and the second one is the presence of outliers 
in the outcomes of the experiment. For the first assumption, logistic regression analyses were used 
to determine the effect of the three factors on the odds of increasing affordability (increasing the 
savings for the target group of countries). Since logistics regression does not contemplate the 
normality assumption, it is used to support ANOVA results [41]. The binary response variable 
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needed in logistics regression was obtained by comparing the change on the outcome of a random 
replicate of the experimentation with the complete set of results from the experimental design. 
This procedure can be done multiple times achieving the same results. For the second assumption, 
Kruskal – Wallis test was used since it uses the rank of the observations to determine significance 
of the factors. The Kruskal Wallis test is the nonparametric alternative to ANOVA in cases where 
the normality assumption and the presence of outliers are unjustified [42]. Finally, a feasibility 
analysis was also required to explain the probable causes of infeasibilities in some replicates of 
the experimentation. Since, the experimental design requires the same number of feasible 
solutions, the simulation was run until 50 feasible replicates were obtained in each experimental 
scenario. 
  
3.4 Data 
An extensive collection of data was needed to feed the mathematical model and resemble as 
close as possible the real vaccine market. All the data and their sources can be found in the 
appendix B and are summarized in Table B 1. However, generation of data was needed for three 
parameters: recovery annuities, supply capacity and vaccine baseline price. The procedures to 
obtain recovery annuities and supply capacity are described in the following subsections while the 
generation of vaccine baseline prices is explained in chapter 4. 
3.4.1 Recovery annuities, 𝑪𝒃𝒑 
Information about the total cost of producing a vaccine is sensitive for vaccine manufacturers 
and therefore real data is not available. It is assumed that the most significant portion of this total 
cost corresponds to the costs of research and development (R&D) and represents the investment 
that manufacturers make and need to recuperate through annualized recovery payments (recovery 
annuities) over a period of time. To generate recovery annuities, it is also assumed that 
manufacturers plan to obtain a return on investment (ROI) of 15 % in a period of 20 years. The 
present value of the manufacturers’ investment for each vaccine is based on other authors’ 
estimates that claim that a new vaccine would cost between 200 and 1000 million dollars 
[43][44][1]. Additionally, more complex vaccines have higher R&D costs (e.g. vaccines with more 
antigens). For example, it is assumed that R&D costs of a monovalent vaccine such as HepB would 
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reach $200 M while the hexavalent vaccine DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV would reach $1000 M. Table 
B2 in the appendix shows the antigens present in each vaccine. Note that multiple manufacturers 
and vaccines are considered, but not all manufacturers produce all vaccines. Relevant 
manufacturers and the vaccines they produce were found in the WHO database (Refer to appendix 
B). The vaccines, the estimated R&D costs and their corresponding recovery annuities are 
presented in Table 2 for the value of interest rate of 15 % (i = 15%). The expression for recovery 
annuities is given by [40]: 
𝐶𝑏𝑝 =  
𝑖  𝑃𝑉𝑏
1 − (1 + 𝑖)−𝑛
 
(5) 
Where: 
𝐶𝑏𝑝  is the recover annuity when manufacturer p produces bundle b 
i  is the desired interest rate per year 
𝑃𝑉𝑏 is the present value of the R&D investment for bundle b 
n  is the number of periods to recover the investment 
Table 2 – Research and Development costs, return on investment and present values of annuities 
for each bundle 
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle name 
R&D costs 
[$ M] 
R&D + 15 % ROI 
(Present Value) 
[$ M] 
Annuity  
(𝑪𝒃𝒑) 
[$ M] 
1 DTaP 260.870 300.000 47.928 
2 HepB 173.913 200.000 31.952 
3 Hib 173.913 200.000 31.952 
4 IPV 173.913 200.000 31.952 
5 MMR 260.870 300.000 47.928 
6 V 695.652 800.000 127.809 
7 DTaP - HepB 608.696 700.000 111.833 
8 DTaP - Hib 608.696 700.000 111.833 
9 DTaP - IPV 608.696 700.000 111.833 
10 HepB - Hib 608.696 700.000 111.833 
11 MMR - V 869.565 1000.000 159.761 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 695.652 800.000 127.809 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 695.652 800.000 127.809 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 695.652 800.000 127.809 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 869.565 1000.000 159.761 
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3.4.2 Manufacturers’ supply capacity, 𝑺𝒃𝒑 
Manufacturers’ supply capacity is information not available but its determination is based on 
a hypothetical demand of each vaccine. Manufacturers’ supply capacity was calculated using the 
number of annual births of the vaccine buyers, the maximum number of doses that a vaccine can 
be administered to a single child (Table B 3) and a score given to the manufacturers according to 
their reports on revenue (Table B 4 and Table B 5). The objective was to allocate enough capacity 
of vaccines to satisfy the demand considering that more complex vaccines (vaccines with more 
antigens) are produced in lower quantities. This procedure is completely arbitrary and does not 
follow any patterns of real vaccine demand due to the consideration of the hypothetical global 
coordinated vaccine market. The resulting allocations of supply capacity per vaccine and 
manufacturer used in this study are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Manufacturers’ supply capacity per vaccine. For Manufacturers’ Id, vaccines’ Id and score given to manufacturers 
refer to Table B4, Table B3 and Table B5, respectively.  
Bundle 
ID 
Manufacturer ID 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 . . 2.2E+07 2.2E+07 . 1.3E+08 . . . . 1.3E+08 1.1E+08 . . 
2 3.3E+07 . 1.7E+07 . 1.7E+07 9.9E+07 3.3E+07 9.9E+07 . . . 8.3E+07 3.3E+07 . 
3 . . . . 1.4E+07 8.3E+07 . 8.3E+07 8.3E+07 . 8.3E+07 6.9E+07 . . 
4 . 3.9E+07 . . . 1.2E+08 . . . . 1.2E+08 9.9E+07 . 3.9E+07 
5 . . . . . 7.2E+07 . 7.2E+07 . . 7.2E+07 6.0E+07 . . 
6 . . . . . 9.2E+07 . 9.2E+07 . . 9.2E+07 . . . 
7 . . 4.6E+06 . . 2.8E+07 . . . . . 2.3E+07 . . 
8 . . . . . . . . 1.9E+07 . 1.9E+07 1.6E+07 . . 
9 . . . . . 5.5E+07 . . . . . . . . 
10 . . . . . . . 5.5E+07 . . . . . . 
11 . . . . . . . 5.5E+07 . . . . . . 
12 4.5E+06 . 2.3E+06 2.3E+06 . 1.4E+07 4.5E+06 . . 2.3E+06 . 1.1E+07 4.5E+06 . 
13 . . . . . 4.5E+07 . . . . . . . . 
14 . . . . . . . . . . 4.5E+07 . . . 
15 . . . . . 2.0E+07 . . . . 2.0E+07 . . . 
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4. VACCINE BASELINE PRICE ESTIMATION 
This section describes how to estimate vaccine baseline prices for different countries when 
countries are grouped in different market segments and the number of such segments varies. The 
methodology described in this section is used to support the experimental design of this study. 
Baseline reservation prices are needed to generate experimental random instances of the 
reservation prices that fall within a desired uncertainty level. An example of the relation between 
baseline prices and reservation prices is shown in Figure 8, in which the upper and lower bounds 
for the reservation price depend on the baseline price and a given range of uncertainty. Baseline 
prices are obtained after fusing current vaccine prices from multiple sources. This information is 
available for a prevalent vaccine market segmentation in which the countries are grouped into four 
income-based market segments (E.g. High, Upper Middle, Lower Middle and Low Income 
Countries). The assumption that baseline prices adequately reflect real vaccine prices is valid since 
vaccine procurement would have not taken place if the reservation prices had been lower than 
those found in the data. Our methodology generates baseline prices (𝑃𝑏𝑚) for each vaccine b that 
is offered to each market segment m and for any number of market segments and segment 
configuration.  
 
Figure 8 – Relation between reservation price uncertainty and baseline price for a specific vaccine 
and market. 
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4.1 Baseline price estimation procedure 
We determine the baseline prices for a vaccine as a function of the vaccine prices of individual 
countries (if available) and a representative GNI per capita of the countries in each market segment. 
The vaccine prices per country are available in various databases that reflected the price paid for 
a vaccine by a country when this country was part of a specific market segment. However, prices 
for some vaccines are not available and often apply to a market segment and not to a specific 
country. We use the GNI per capita and the annual births of 194 countries to estimate a 
representative GNI per capita for any given market segment. Vaccine prices were related to this 
representative GNI per capita for each market segment and regression methods were used to 
determine mathematical expressions to calculate vaccine prices for any value of the representative 
GNI per capita of the market segment. The process of baseline price determination as a function 
of the GNI of a market segment and a specific vaccine is shown in Figure 9. This figure shows the 
databases that were used to obtain vaccine prices of individual countries and the representative 
GNI per capita of a market segment. All the data is concentrated in a main database and analyzed 
with regression methodologies to obtain the mathematical expressions mentioned before. The 
comparison between real and generated prices is presented in Table C 14 in appendix C. The 
procedure to determine the representative GNI per capita of a market segment, the conditions for 
baseline price generation and the regression methods that were used are explained next. 
4.2 Determination of the representative GNI per capita in each market segment 
A market segment groups countries with similar purchasing power and whose vaccine 
reservation prices are assumed to be the same. However, the value of the GNI per capita in the 
market segment cannot be the average GNI per capita of all the countries within a market segment 
since countries have different number of children to immunize. Therefore, the GNI per capita for 
each market segment is estimated by a weighted average of the GNI per capita of its countries 
weighted by the number of annual births. The GNI of each market segment is computed by the 
following expression: 
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
∑ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝑏𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 , (6) 
where: 
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𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐        Gross National Income per capita for country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 (C is the set of Countries) 
𝑏𝑐      annual births occurring in country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  index that represent a specific segment (E.g. HIC, LIC, etc.) 
 
Figure 9 – Baseline prices generation process. CDC = Centers for Disease and Control, CIA = 
Central Intelligence Agency, PAHO = Pan American Health Organization, UN = United Nations, 
UNICEF = The United Nations Children’s Fund, V3P = The Vaccine Product, Price and 
Procurement project, WB = The World Bank, WHO = World Health Organization. A, B and C 
represent antigens in a bundle. 
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The values that the number of market segments can take are 2, 4, 8 and 12 (refer to Table 1). 
The resulting estimated GNI per capita for each market segment is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Representative GNI per capita [USD] for each market segment for different 
segmentation configurations 
Current market 
segmentation 
Number of Market segments (m) 
m = 2 m = 4 m = 8 m = 12 
HIC 
16445.41 
42317.93 
90632.42 
151877.90 
67802.54 
41776.46 
41043.13 
UMIC 7407.19 
11102.34 
11805.09 
8787.69 
5816.68 
5677.29 
LMIC 
1540.044 
1934.868 
3205.12 
3421.08 
2631.46 
1629.67 
1466.16 
LIC 618.3402 
778.04 
879.12 
498.05 
392.87 
238.86 
 
4.3 Considerations for baseline price generation 
The output of the baseline price generation methodology are mathematical expressions that 
obtain baseline prices as a function of the GNI for each market segment and for a specific vaccine. 
These expressions are based on price data obtained from the current segmentation (4 market 
segments), and are used to generate baseline prices for any number of market segments. A hard 
assumption in this methodology is that the prices will be linearly dependent on GNI to meet the 
following conditions: 
 Prices for higher income market segments should be greater than the prices for lower income 
ones. This situation resembles the price segmentation of the current vaccine market.  
 Combination vaccine prices (vaccines with more than one antigen, e.g. 2-antigen, 3-antigen, 
4-antigen) should be higher than the sum of the prices of their monovalent or multi-antigen 
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components. This is to justify the increased benefit of using combination vaccines and also to 
consider the economic benefit of monovalent vaccines.  
 The resulting prices should be similar to the prices found in data to capture similar monetary 
value.  
 Vaccine prices should closely follow a mathematical expression as a function of the GNI of a 
market segment.  
 Prices must be positive for any given GNI. Coefficients that were obtained after regression 
analyses could generate negative baseline prices depending on the GNI per capita of a given 
market segment. The procedure to avoid negative baseline prices is explained in section 4.4.    
 
4.4 Regression analyses to obtain baseline prices as a function of GNI per capita of a 
market segment for each vaccine 
A summary of the regression methods used to generate baseline prices is shown in Figure 10. The 
methodology consists of 4 parts: 
1. Multiple linear regression was used to determine the coefficients of a linear model that 
represents the relationship between vaccine prices from data (response variable) with the GNI 
of the market segment (real independent variable) and the presence of a particular antigen in 
the vaccine (binary independent variables). The table of the variables as well as the results of 
the model can be found in Table C 1 and C 2 in the appendix C. Figure 11 shows the prices 
per vaccine in each market segment generated with multiple linear regression. A clear pattern 
of increasing prices for more complex vaccines is visible. Unfortunately, some prices resulted 
in negative values due to the intercept coefficient that was obtained from the multiple linear 
regression. To avoid negative prices for any segmentation configuration, two extreme cases of 
segmentation were considered. These cases correspond to the countries with lowest and highest 
GNI per capita as if they were considered as two different market segments (LGNIS and 
HGNIS that stand for lowest and highest GNI segment respectively. Refer to tables C 3 through 
C 6). Then, a positive integer constant was added to the intercept coefficient to increase the 
value of all the vaccines simultaneously until all the prices are positive. This is shown in Figure 
12. Vaccine prices for both figures are found in Table C3 and Table C4 respectively. 
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Figure 10 – Regression methods used to estimate vaccine baseline prices. 
2. Using the output from step 1, factors of price increment were calculated for each vaccine and 
market segment with the following relation: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
∑  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠′𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑒
                                              (7) 
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decomposed into the 
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Independent variables:
 GNI 
 Presence of antigens in each vaccine
Vaccines considered: all
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Combination vaccines were grouped by their number of antigens (e.g. 2-antigen, 3-antigen, 4-
antigen) and the average increment for each group was calculated considering the increment 
factors from the market segments UMIC, LMIC, LIC. Note that according to the prices 
generated from the multiple linear regression, for the market segment HIC, there is no benefit 
in using monovalent vaccines (the sum of the prices of monovalent vaccines is greater than the 
price of the combination vaccine) and therefore these factors were not considered. Table 5 
shows the factors of increment used for each group of vaccines supported in Table C 6. 
 
Figure 11 – Multiple linear regression with data provided for baseline price generation. 
 
Figure 12 – Multiple linear regression after shifting the intercept coefficient to obtain positive 
relationships. 
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Table 5 – Increment factors for antigen-number groups of combination vaccines. (See Table C 6) 
Number of antigens 
in a vaccine 
Increment factor 
1 1 
2 1.50 
3 1.50 
4 1.50 
 
3. Separately, the relation between the price of each monovalent vaccine (response variable) and 
the GNI of the market segment (independent variable) was found through linear regression. 
The linear regression analyses can be found in tables C 7 through C 12. Prices for combination 
vaccines are found by the product of the sum of the monovalent component prices and the 
increment factor obtained in part 2. 
4. Linear regression is used to obtain the coefficients of the mathematical expressions for the 
combination vaccine prices as a function of the GNI per capita of the market segment. This 
information is in Table 6 and the plot in Figure 13 shows the linear relations that prices have 
with different values of GNI. 
Table 6 – Coefficients for price equations as a function of the GNI per vaccine 
ID Number Name Intercept GNI coefficient 
1 DTaP 8.647000000 0.000179600 
2 HepB 0.015650000 0.000217400 
3 Hib 2.092000000 0.000294300 
4 IPV 4.116000000 0.000157100 
5 MMR 1.733000000 0.000236400 
6 V 7.418340900 0.001164500 
7 DTaP - HepB 12.993975000 0.000595500 
8 DTaP - Hib 16.108500000 0.000710850 
9 DTaP - IPV 19.144500000 0.000505050 
10 HepB - Hib 3.161475000 0.000767550 
11 MMR - V 13.727011350 0.002101350 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 16.131975000 0.001036950 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 19.167975000 0.000831150 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 22.282500000 0.000946500 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 22.305975000 0.001272600 
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4.5 Results of the Baseline Price Estimation 
Figure 13 shows the relations between baseline prices and GNI per capita for each vaccine 
using the coefficients presented in Table 6. With these coefficients, the baseline prices for any 
vaccine can be calculated using the representative value of the GNI of a market segment. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Linear relations of the baseline price as a function of the GNI for all vaccines. 
Grouped by color: blue and red -> 1-antigen vaccines, green and black -> 2-antigen vaccines, 
yellow -> 3-antigen vaccines, purple -> 4-antigen vaccines.  
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5. RESULTS 
This section shows the results of the experimental design that explains the influence that 
changing the three factors of interest have on the metrics defined in section 3.1. The Monte Carlo 
simulation approach to solve the SABP was implemented in AMPL and solved using KNITRO 
9.0 whereas the statistical analyses were performed in Minitab, R and Microsoft Excel.  
Fifty random instances for each of the 64 experimental scenarios that result from the interaction 
of the different levels of the factors of interest were solved in the simulation (refer to Table 1 and 
Figure 3). After solving each instance, the following statistics were created: Market Value, 
Customer Surplus of the Target group with respect to the Market Value, Customer Surplus of the 
Non-target group with respect to the Market Value, Total Profit with respect to the Market Value 
and Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value. 
All the statistical tests, validity conditions and plots to support the results from the 
experimental design are in Appendix D. Additionally, the experimental scenarios in which the 
factor levels number of market segments m = 2, 4 and interest rate i = 20%, produced only 
infeasible results and therefore, the factor level i = 20% was excluded from the statistical analyses 
to maintain the same number of observations per experimental scenario.  
The metrics will be described using the expected values of the components of the following 
equation (Refer to chapter 3 – Metrics).  
𝐸 [
𝑀𝑉
𝑀𝑉
] = 𝐸 [
𝐶𝑆𝑇
𝑀𝑉
] + 𝐸 [
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝑀𝑉
] +  𝐸 [
𝑇𝑃
𝑀𝑉
] + 𝐸 [
𝑇𝐴
𝑀𝑉
] 
 
Where: 
𝑀𝑉      is Market Value 
𝐶𝑆𝑇  is Customer Surplus for the Target group of countries 
𝐶𝑆𝑁  is Customer Surplus for the Non-target group of countries 
TP        is Total Profit 
TA      is the Total Annuities 
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5.1 Effects on the Expected Market Value (E[MV]) 
Clearly, the factor reservation price uncertainty (n) has the greatest first order effect on the 
expected Market Value. Figure 14 shows the main effects associated with the Market Value from 
which it can be seen that the higher the uncertainty in reservation prices, the higher the expected 
Market Value. The value of the expected Market Value increases from $18.21 Billion to $19.63 
Billion, an increase of 7.79%, when the factor reservation price uncertainty (n) changes from 5% 
to 20%. The ANOVA test shows that the three factors of interest and the interaction between the 
number of markets segments (m) and the uncertainty in reservation prices (n) are significant at 
95% confidence level. When the factor minimum attractive rate of return (i) changes from 5% to 
15% there is a decrement on the expected Market Value of 0.58% while increasing the number of 
market segments (m) from 2 to 8 market segments also increases the expected Market Value by 
0.32%. Additionally, an increase in the variability of the Market Value is strongly associated with 
the increase of uncertainty in reservation prices (n). The positive coefficients associated with the 
reservation price uncertainty (n) in the logistics regressions mean that increasing the value of 
uncertainty in reservation prices would increase the probabilities of increasing the expected Market 
Value whereas the negative coefficient of the minimum attractive rate of return (i) would decrease 
it (refer to Table D1). Finally, the rank tests performed for all combinations of number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) also indicate that the difference between 
groups are statistically significant. Hence, the Market Value depends mainly on the reservation 
price uncertainty (see Figure 19). These results are aligned with the definition of the Market Value 
which is equivalent to the sum of reservation prices involved in vaccine procurement. An increase 
in the reservation price uncertainty range (n) will allow reservation prices to take higher values 
and therefore, it will increase the Market Value. 
5.2 Effects on the expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the 
Market Value, E [CST / MV] 
The expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the Market Value is 
affected mainly by the number of market segments (m) and the minimum attractive rate of return 
(i). ANOVA in Table D2 shows that all main effects of the factors, and many of the interaction 
effects are significant. 
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Figure 14 – Effects of the factors of interest reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) on the expected Market Value (E[MV]) 
 
Figure 15 – Effects of the factors of interest reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) on the expected Customer Surplus for the 
Target group of countries with respect to the Market Value (CST / MV) 
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Figure 14 shows that an increase in the number of market segments (m) from 2 to 12 would 
increase the expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the Market Value 
from 18.16% to 22.25 % while the change in the minimum attractive rate of return (i) from 5 to 15 
% would decrease it from 20.72% to 19.75%. Numerically, the expected Market Value obtained 
from all the replicates is $18.93 Billion. Therefore, the increase of 4.09% on the expected 
Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the Market Value represents $770 M more 
in savings for the target group of countries. Likewise, Logistics regressions and Kruskal-Wallis 
test support these results (Refer to Table D2). These results show that the expected Customer 
Surplus for countries in the target group with respect to the Market Value increase when the 
number of market segments (m) increases and the minimum attractive rate of return (i) decreases. 
5.3 Effects on the expected Customer Surplus for the Non-target group with respect to 
the Market Value, E[CSN / MV] 
Interestingly, the expected Customer Surplus for the Non-target group with respect to the 
Market Value is positively influenced by increasing number of market segments (m) and a 
decreasing minimum attractive rate of return (i). The statistical analyses in Table D3 show that the 
behavior of the expected Customer Surplus for the Non-target group with respect to the Market 
Value (E[CSN / MV]) is very similar to the expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with 
respect to the Market Value (E[CST / MV]) where the number of market segments (m) and the 
minimum attractive rate of return (i) explain the major portion of the variability although some 
interactions are also significant at confidence level of 95%. Figure 16 shows that when the number 
of market segments (m) is 2 and 12, the expected Customer Surplus for the Non-target group with 
respect to the Market Value represents 33.26% and 38.22% respectively. The average increase is 
4.96% which means that the Non-target group benefits more than the Target group from an 
increase of the number of market segments. This increase would be equivalent to $939 Million. 
Similar to the expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the Market Value, 
the increment in the minimum attractive rate of return (i) from 5% to 15%, reduces the expected 
Customer Surplus for the Non-target group with respect to the Market Value by 1.75%, which is 
greater than the reduction of the expected Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to 
the Market Value for the same conditions. These results are shown in Figure 21. Accordingly, the 
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increase in number of market segments (m) would increase the savings for countries in the Non-
target group with respect to the Market Value and would decrease the savings for countries in the 
Non-target group if the minimum attractive rate of return (i) increases. The results for the expected 
Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to the Market Value and expected Customer 
Surplus for the Non-target group with respect to the Market Value follow the idea that in a 
coordinated vaccine market, both Non-target and Target would improve their affordability 
conditions by increasing the number of market segments (m) and reducing the minimum attractive 
rate of return (i). The other statistical tests support these results as well. 
 
Figure 16 – Effects of the factors of interest reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) on the expected Customer Surplus for the 
Non-target group of countries with respect to the Market Value (CSN / MV) 
5.4 Effects on the expected Total Profit with respect to the Market Value, E[TP/MV] 
The expected Total Profit with respect to the Market Value decreases when the number of 
market segments (m) or the minimum attractive rate of return (i) increases (Refer to Table D 4). 
Figure 17 shows that by increasing the number of market segments (m) from 2 to 12, the expected 
Total Profit with respect to the Market Value decreases 9.26% which can be compared with the 
sum of the gains in savings by the target and non-target groups of countries. In monetary terms, it 
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represents $1.75 Billion which is slightly more than the sum of the savings. However, these 
differences might be explained due to the variability of the metrics in the analysis. Additionally, 
the minimum attractive rate of return (i) that manufacturers would receive also affects their profit 
as the value of this factor increases. Manufacturers would lose 2.83% in the expected total profit 
with respect to the Market Value if the minimum attractive rate of return (i) has an increment from 
5% to 15%. Clearly, manufacturers absorb the benefits that market segments have when the 
segmentation number (m) increases while an increase in the minimum attractive rate of return (i) 
would affect more the manufacturers more than market segments. Finally, an increase in the 
minimum attractive rate of return (i) increases the annuity necessary to cover the costs, and hence, 
it reduces the funds that are counted as profit during the procurement cycle. Figure 22 illustrates 
the effects of the factors that are also supported by the additional statistical tests. 
 
Figure 17 – Effects of the factors of interest reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) on the expected Total Profit with respect 
to the Market Value (TP / MV) 
5.5 Effects on the expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value, TA/MV 
Expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value increases as minimum attractive 
rate of return (i) increases. This results make sense since the minimum attractive rate of return is 
directly related to annuities by the equation presented in chapter 4. The statistical analyses are in 
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Table D 5. Figure 18 shows that an increase in the minimum attractive rate of return (i) from 5% 
to 15% produces an increase in the expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value of 
5.64% which would represent $1.07 Billion considering the average Market Value of $18.93 
Billion. Additionally, the expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value is also 
affected significantly by reservation price uncertainty (n) and the interaction minimum attractive 
rate of return (i) and reservation prices uncertainty (n). Expected Total Annuities with respect to 
the Market Value decreases as the minimum attractive rate of return (i) increases. The increment 
in proportion of Expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value explains the 
detrimental effect that the increase in the minimum attractive rate of return produces for both, 
manufacturers and market segments. This means that neither of them would be interested in market 
conditions in which the minimum attractive rate of return is set too high since it would not provide 
benefits in profits or savings. Figure 23 shows these effects, and it is interesting to note the 
interaction between reservation price uncertainty, minimum attractive rate of return and number 
of market segments when the minimum attractive rate of return is 10 %. Additionally, note that for 
the minimum attractive rate of return ≠ 10%, the number of market segments does not affect that 
expected Total Annuities with respect to the Market Value. 
 
Figure 18 – Effects of the factors of interest reservation price uncertainty (n), number of market 
segments (m) and minimum attractive rate of return (i) on the expected Total Annuities with 
respect to the Market Value (TA / MV)
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Figure 19 – Market Value (MV) as a function of the factors reservation price uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i), and 
colored by number of market segments (m). n increases MV its variability whereas m and i has almost no effect on MV. 
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Figure 20 – Customer Surplus for the Target group with respect to Market Value (CST / MV) as a function of the factors 
reservation price uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i), and colored by number of market segments (m). As m increases 
CST / MV increases. Conversely, as i increases CST / MV decreases. 
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Figure 21 – Customer Surplus for the Non-target with respect to Market Value (CSN / MV) as a function of the factors 
reservation price uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i), and colored by number of market segments (m). As m increases 
CSN / MV increases. Conversely, as i increases CSN / MV decreases. 
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Figure 22 – Total Profit with respect to Market Value (TP / MV) as a function of the factors reservation price uncertainty 
range (n) and interest rate (i), and colored by number of market segments (m). As m and i increase TP/ MV decreases.  
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Figure 23 – Total Annuities with respect to Market Value (TA / MV) as a function of the factors reservation price uncertainty 
range (n) and interest rate (i), and colored by number of market segments (m). As i increase TA/ MV increases.  
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5.6 Analysis  
The key insights: 
(1) Uncertain reservations prices: the uncertainty associated with reservation prices is 
important in estimating the value of the vaccine market, which means that closer estimations of 
reservation prices would reduce the noise in establishing the Market Value. The Market Value 
could be used by the monopsonistic entity to estimate the expected monetary values that customers 
and manufacturers would receive after vaccine procurement. Since the average portions of the 
Market Value corresponding to customers’ savings and manufacturers’ profits remain stable even 
when the Market Value changes, the uncertainty in reservation prices should not affect vaccine 
affordability. This does not mean that the estimation of reservation prices is unimportant but 
excessive uncertainty could underestimate or overestimate the Market Value. In fact, reservation 
prices drive vaccine procurement, and therefore, closer estimations would provide always more 
accurate results.  
(2) Number of market segments: This factor influences vaccine affordability and profit. The 
change in number of market segments with vaccine prices that are function of the GNI would 
allocate countries in segments that are more distanced to their ability to pay, which affects also 
manufacturers’ profits. The idea behind segmentation and tiered pricing in the vaccine market is 
that countries with lower income have access to immunization regardless of their income level, 
but reducing profits for manufacturers in a fragile vaccine market can not be a sustainable option. 
Nevertheless, the number of vaccine markets can be further analyzed to determine the conditions 
under which different segmentation policies could be a viable option. 
(3) Minimum attractive rate of return: Negative effects for both, customers and 
manufacturers are associated with an increase of this interest rate. The interest rate is directly 
associated with annuities, therefore the effect on annuities due to a change of interest rate is not 
surprising. However, the effect that it produces on customers’ savings and manufacturers’ profits 
is relevant. The portion of the Market Value destined to annuities will grow as the interest rate 
increases, reducing the portions that represent the benefits for manufacturers and customers. 
Clearly, this factor is not aligned with improving vaccine affordability since decreasing the interest 
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rate to increase affordability would mean that manufacturers are willing to reduce their 
compensation for the risk in investing on vaccines, which is unrealistic. 
 
5.7 Effect on affordability due to changes in the number of market segments in a 
coordinated vaccine market 
Given that there is no evidence that reservation price uncertainty and minimum attractive rate 
of return improve affordability conditions, only the number of market segments is considered from 
this point and forward. By fixing the value of the factors interest rate and reservation prices 
uncertainty, the influence of the number of market segments in the coordinated vaccine market can 
be isolated. As the number of market segments increases, Customer Surplus for the Target with 
respect to Market Value and Customer Surplus for the Non-target with respect to Market Value 
increase whereas the Total Profit with respect to the Market Value decreases. Additionally, the 
number of market segments does not influence the Total Annuities with respect to the Market 
Value unless an interaction between interest rate, reservation price uncertainty and number of 
market segments exists and therefore could be considered constant. Finally, the feasibility analysis 
suggests that the number of market segments could not increase indefinitely, since at some value 
of number of market segments, the decrease in Total Profit with respect to the Market Value would 
become unreasonable. These effects are illustrated in Figure 24. Additionally, recall expression 
(3) in Chapter 3, which means that the Market Value is equal to the total savings of the buyers plus 
the total profit for the manufacturers and the total annuities. Note that the sum of the total profit 
and the total annuities for manufacturers represent the procurement costs that buyers pay to get the 
vaccines (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝐴 = 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑇 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑁). If the procurement costs are isolated again by group, 
then, 
𝑀𝑉 = 𝐶𝑆𝑇 + 𝐶𝑆𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝐴 = 𝐶𝑆𝑇 + 𝐶𝑆𝑁 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑇 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑁 (8) 
 
For the values of the reservation price uncertainty of 10% and the interest rate of 5%, the 
metrics are shown in Figure 25. In Figure 26 a numerical example shows the effect of the number 
of market segments on affordability. 
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Figure 24 – Influence of the factor number of market segments (m) in a coordinated vaccine 
market. 
 
 
Figure 25 – Mean values of the components of the Market Value (MV).  
 
46 
 
Figure 26 – Numerical example that shows the effects on affordability of the change in the number 
of market segments (m). The value of MV is the average of the Market Values of all instances with 
conditions n=10% and i=5%. COST_T and COST_N represent the procurement costs for each 
group. 
5.8 Extension to consider vaccine donors – The Market Segmentation Problem 
Given the effect that the number of market segments has on affordability, two strategies can 
be followed to increase vaccine affordability. The first one is to increase the number of market 
segments for the Target group of countries and reduce the number of market segments for the Non-
target group of countries, so that the increase in savings for the Target group matches the loss of 
savings for the Non-Target group while manufacturers’ profits are not affected. The second option 
is to find the mechanisms to compensate the loss of profit that occurs when the number of market 
segments increases. One of such mechanisms could be the inclusion of donor support for vaccine 
procurement. 
In the real vaccine market, donors play a key role in supporting international organizations that 
provide immunization in the poorest countries. UNICEF, the largest vaccine buyer, is mainly 
financed by donors for immunization procurement in low income countries. For example, the 
Audrey Hepburn Society, which is part of the U.S. fund for UNICEF, is a group of donors that 
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annually donate $10.000+ to UNICEF [45] while the Gates Foundation has donated Billions of 
dollars since 2001 to boost vaccination [46]. Generally, donors’ commitments lasts several years 
[18]. The inclusion of donors in the framework of this study could improve vaccine affordability 
by mitigating the loss of profit that manufacturers perceive when the number of market segments 
increases.  
Assuming that there is a significant support from donors or the countries in the Non-target 
group in the coordinated vaccine market, large enough to compensate for the loss of profit for 
manufacturers, the question that the monopsonistic entity faces is: what is the number of segments 
in which the Target and Non-target groups have to be divided into so that the affordability for the 
countries in the Target group is maximized when donors have a limited budget? To answer this 
question, a mathematical model, the Market Segmentation Problem is proposed using the 
experimental results obtained in this study. In this model, it is assumed that the reduction in 
manufacturers’ profits is proportional to the payment made by countries in the Non-target and 
Target groups for vaccine procurement. Since Total Annuities (TA) represent a constant portion of 
the Market Value and the buyers’ payments have to cover Total Annuities (TA) and Total Profit 
(TP), this assumption is valid. Then, the mathematical model finds a balance between the increase 
in savings and costs for customers, subject to a known budget that accounts for the donors’ 
contribution over a period of several years. This is a classic problem in optimization and it is 
known as the Knapsack problem. 
To determine the benefit in savings and the increase in cost for the Non-target and Target 
groups, the results obtained from the experimentation are used. Note that in Figure 25, the 
horizontal axis represents the sum of the segments for both Non-target and Target groups. For 
example, when the number of market segments is 8 (m=8), it means that the Target group has 4 
segments and the Non-target group has 4 segments as well. Therefore, a segment (s) in the Market 
Segmentation problem can be seen as the number of market segments of each group divided by 2 
(m/2). Figure 28 shows the same information as Figure 25 with the difference that the former 
shows the horizontal axis in terms of s. Figure 28 shows the average costs with respect to the 
Market Value for both groups (COSTT/MV and COSTN/MV) as a function of s. Using this 
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information, algebraic functions are used to determine the change in savings and the increase in 
cost for both groups (See functions 𝐹(𝑠𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆), 𝐺(𝑠𝐻𝐼𝑀𝑆), 𝐻(𝑠𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆), 𝐽(𝑠𝐻𝐼𝑀𝑆) in Figure 28). 
 
Figure 27 – Mean proportions of the components of the Market Value as a function of the 
segments in each group Non-target and Target (s = m/2).  
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Figure 28 – Mean proportions of the components of the Market Value as a function of the 
segments in each group Non-target and Target (s = m/2). Functions J and H represent 
customers’ savings with respect to the Market Value while functions G and F represent the 
procurement costs for each group. 
The change in savings and increase in costs must assume an initial or current value of s to 
compute the change appropriately. Then the change in savings and increase in costs are represented 
by the functions provided in Figure 28 by: 
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝐽(𝑠𝑁)0 − 𝐽(𝑠𝑁))𝑀𝑉 
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝐻(𝑠𝑇,)0 − 𝐻
(𝑠𝑇)) 𝑀𝑉 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝐺(𝑠𝑁) − 𝐺(𝑠𝑁)0)𝑀𝑉 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝐹(𝑠𝑇) − 𝐹(𝑠𝑇)0)𝑀𝑉 
 
Where: 
𝐹(𝑠𝑇)  is the function of the procurement costs for the group T evaluated with s. 
𝐺(𝑠𝑁)  is the function of the procurement costs for the group N evaluated with s. 
𝐻(𝑠𝑇)  is the function of the savings for the group T evaluated with s. 
𝐽(𝑠𝑁)  is the function of the savings for the group N evaluated with s. 
0  is the index that accounts for the chosen initial value of s. 
MV  represents the Market Value 
For example, if the initial value of segments (s) for the Non-target group is 1 (𝑠𝑁 = 1), and s 
is required to change to 4 (𝑠𝑁 = 4), the value in dollars of the gain in savings and increase in costs 
for Non-target group are: 
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝑗(4) − 𝑗(1))𝑀𝑉 = 𝑎𝑠𝑔 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = (𝑔(1) − 𝑔(4))𝑀𝑉 = 𝑐𝑠𝑔 
The mathematical model for the Market Segmentation problem is presented next:  
Sets: 
𝐺 Set of groups (E.g. N, T). 
𝑆 Set of number of segments in which a group 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺can be divided into. 
Parameters: 
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𝑎𝑠𝑔 Marginal savings gained by group 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 when it is divided into 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 segments. 
𝑐𝑠𝑔 Marginal additional costs incurred by group 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 when it is divided into 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 segments. 
𝐵 Budget available from donors. 
Variables: 
𝑋𝑔𝑠 Binary value taking the value of 1 if group 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 takes the value 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, and zero otherwise. 
Objective: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒:     2 ( ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝑋𝑔𝑠
𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑔 ∈ 𝐺|𝑔=𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆
) + ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝑋𝑔𝑠
𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑔 ∈ 𝐺|𝑔=𝐻𝐼𝑀𝑆
                             (𝑒1) 
 
Constraints: 
∑ 𝑋𝑔𝑠
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
= 1                                      , 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺                                                                                               (𝑒2) 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝑐𝑔𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆𝑔∈𝐺
≤ 𝐵                                                                                                                                 (𝑒3) 
 
The objective function (1) maximizes the savings for both groups although it seeks to 
maximize the savings for the group T first (Note the artificial weight of 2 given in the objective 
function). The constraint (2) ensures that only one segmentation is selected for each group. Finally, 
constraint (3) ensures that the marginal costs incurred by any group and segment is less than the 
available budget of the donors. Additionally, the following constraint would help to maintain the 
segmentation fixed for the Non-target group of countries, in the case that donors’ budget could 
only be used for increasing affordability for the Target group of countries. 
𝑋1,2 = 1                                                                                                                                                       (𝑒4) 
 
5.9 Results for the Market Segmentation Problem 
The Market Segmentation problem was tested assuming that the maximum number of 
segments (s) per group is 6 since the maximum number of market segments considered in the 
experimentation was 12 (m =12 and therefore s = m/2). The Market Value is assumed to be $18.75 
Billion and the monopsonistic entity has an available budget from donors. The functions for the 
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marginal savings gained and costs increased by group are considered linear and are presented in 
Figure 29.  
 
 
Figure 29 – Mean proportions of the components of the Market Value as a function of the segments 
in the Target and Non-target groups (s = m/2). Functions used in the experiments of the 
mathematical model. 
The two strategies described previously were considered depending on whether or not the 
constraint e4 is enforced in the mathematical model. Figure 30 illustrates the results of these 
strategies. The results show that the allocation of segments per group decreases as the donors’ 
budget decreases. The first strategy, the case in which the Non-target group can adopt any 
segmentation as long as the affordability of the Target group is maximized, is represented as (1) 
in Figure 30. If the budget of donors is more than manufacturer’s loss of profit, then the number 
of segments within a group is as large as possible. For example, if the budget is around $1.8 Billion, 
the Non-target and the Target groups should have 6 segments each (𝑠𝑁 = 6, 𝑠𝑇 = 6, 𝑚 = 12). 
Below this budget, the segments for the Non-target group need to be reduced while the segments 
for the Target group maintains its maximum number of segments. When donors’ budget is between 
$0.7 and $0.8 Billion, the Non-target group have to be grouped as a single segment to maintain the 
segmentation for the Target group with 6 segments. Bellow $0.7 Billion the segmentation for the 
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Target group decreases. For the second strategy (2), in which the Non-target group maintains its 
segmentation fixed (𝑠𝑇 = 2), more contribution from donors is needed to increase affordability for 
the Target group. The total contribution of the donors is less than strategy (1) since increasing the 
savings for the Non-target group is not in the interests of the donors. The amount needed to 
maximize the savings for the Target group under this strategy is around $0.9 Billion, which splits 
the Target group into 6 segments (𝑠𝑁 = 2, 𝑠𝑇 = 6, 𝑚 = 8). 
 
 
Figure 30 – Results from the Market Segmentation Problem to determine the number of market 
segments for different values of the donors’ budget. (1) does not consider constraint e4 (2) 
means that the segmentation of the group N is fixed to s=2 by using constraint e4. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study focuses on a hypothetical coordinated vaccine market to understand the effects on 
vaccine affordability of three factors: number of market segments, reservation price uncertainty 
range and interest rate. The methodology used Monte Carlo simulation and mathematical 
optimization within an experimental design to determine the significance of those factors. 
Additionally, various statistical analyses were used to support the results of the experimental 
design. Among the three factors, the only one associated with affordability is the number of market 
segments. Positive effects in customers’ savings are induced as the number of market segments 
increases. However, the increase in affordability through segmentation results in loss of profit for 
manufacturers. The other two factors influence the market in different ways but not on improving 
affordability. Particularly, uncertainty range defines the Market Value, while increasing the 
interest rate is detrimental for customers’ and manufacturers’ benefits. Additionally, this study 
presents a perspective of the vaccine market under the influence of a changing number of market 
segments in which customers and manufacturers are considered simultaneously. Finally, a 
framework to explore the vaccine market under different segmentation was created to include the 
participation of vaccine donors. A binary mathematical model was created to find the optimal 
number of segments at which higher and lower income market segments should be divided to 
maximize vaccine affordability subject to a specific budget of the vaccine donors.  
Important assumptions were made throughout this study for which more research is needed. 
One of the most important ones is about the linear relation between GNI per capita and vaccine 
prices. This assumption was used to generate sound vaccine baseline prices for any number of 
market segments. Although GNI per capita might not be linearly related with vaccine prices, it 
certainly influences vaccine pricing, and therefore this assumption is consistent. Extensions of this 
study would include more or new methods for segmentation such as clustering with multiple 
variables to account for more than the GNI and the number of births as variables considered in 
vaccine pricing estimation. Furthermore, this study was based only on symmetrically partitioned 
market segments, a homogenous segmentation across all market segments, and then the results 
were artificially extended to consider heterogeneous segmentation based on experimental results. 
However, preliminary results show that by heterogeneously partitioning the market segments, 
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more benefits for customers can be achieved when using mathematical optimization due to 
different allocation of vaccines and prices that such segmentations induce. The heterogeneous 
segmentation could be approached as a combinatorial optimization problem in which the local 
segmentation of the market segments can be explored individually. Additionally, the intervention 
of donors could play a key role in a heterogeneous segmentation of the market since resources 
could be concentrated in key segments that do not necessarily correspond to the lowest income 
countries. Future research on heterogeneous segmentation could lead to analytically define the 
optimal segmentation of the vaccine market, or find the optimal GNI level at which the countries 
should be grouped within a market segment so that affordability is maximized. 
The results of this research can be used by international organizations that would act similarly 
as the monopsonistic entity considered in this study (E.g. UNICEF, PAHO). Following similar 
procedures, these entities could define and establish new segmentation policies that would foster 
vaccine affordability as long as the incentives for manufacturers are planned accordingly. 
However, the lack of sensitive information from consumers and manufacturers could still be a big 
wall to go through. Additionally, vaccine donors could benefit from this research by considering 
a general framework in which donations needed to achieve affordability and access of vaccines 
can be analytically assessed. Such applications could create a path to increase the access and 
affordability of vaccines in the real vaccine market. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A – Mathematical expressions for CST, CSN and GNIsegment 
Sets: 
𝐶  set of 194 countries 
𝐿𝐼𝐶  subset of 57 countries 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 given that 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐 < $1045 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝐶 subset of 52 countries 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 given that $1,045.00 ≤ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐 < $4,125.00 
𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 subset of 49 countries 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 given that $4,125.00 ≤ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐 < $12,745.00 
𝐻𝐼𝐶  subset of 36 countries 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 given that 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐 ≥ $12,746.00 
 
Parameters 
 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐     Gross National Income per capita for country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
𝑏𝑐       annual births occurring in country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
𝑎𝑐𝑚  binary parameter taking the value of 1 if country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 belongs to market 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
 
Variables 
𝑆𝑚  Savings per market segment 𝑚 𝜖 𝑀 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑚 Savings per child in market segment 𝑚 𝜖 𝑀 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑚 Savings per country that is in market segment 𝑚 𝜖 𝑀 
 
Savings per market 
𝑆𝑚 = ∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑏𝑚𝑝(𝑅𝑏𝑚(𝜉) − 𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑝)
𝑏∈𝐵2(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑃
         , 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
 
Savings per child per market 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑚 =
𝑆𝑚
𝑙𝑚
                                                             , 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 
 
Savings per country 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑐 = ∑ (𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑚)
𝑚∈𝑀
                                  , 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
 
Savings for a specific market segment  
𝐶𝑆𝑇 = ∑ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑐
𝑐 𝜖 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝐶 ∪ 𝐿𝐼𝐶 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑁 = ∑ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑐
𝑐 𝜖 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 ∪ 𝐻𝐼𝐶 
 
 
GNI per capita (GNI) for a specific market segment 
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
∑ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝑏𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
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Appendix B – Data Sources 
Table B 1– Data sources for the parameters of the SABP. 
Parameters Source * 
Antigens WHO [47] 
Market segments WB [48] 
Vaccines (bundles) WHO [49] 
Vaccine Manufacturers WHO [49] 
Reservation Prices GAVI[50]⁠, PAHO[51], UNICEF[52]⁠, V3P[53], CDC[54] 
Annual births CIA [55], WB [56]⁠, 
Minimum doses of antigens WHO [47]⁠ 
Maximum doses of bundles Proano, et al. [14] 
GNI per capita (GNI) WB [57]⁠, UN [58] 
National Immunization Expenditure WHO [59]⁠ 
Recovery annuities ATMI [21]⁠ ** 
Supply capacity ** 
Vaccine baseline prices ** 
*ATMI = Access to Medicine Index, CDC = Centers for Disease and Control, CIA = Central 
Intelligence Agency, GAVI = Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization, PAHO = Pan 
American Health Organization, UN = United Nations, UNICEF = The United Nations Children’s 
Fund, V3P = The Vaccine Product, Price and Procurement project, WB = The World Bank, WHO 
= World Health Organization, 
** Assumed values. 
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Table B 2 – Antigens considered in experimentation [47] 
Bundle 
ID 
Antigen 
Recommended 
number of 
doses per child 
Description Observations 
1 DTaP 3 
Diphtheria and tetanus 
toxoid with acellular 
pertussis 
Considered as 1 antigen even 
though it represents 3 anti-
gens due to the extensive use 
in this form. 
2 HepB 3 Hepatitis B    
3 Hib 3 
Haemophilus influen-
zae type B  
  
4 IPV 3 Inactivated polio    
5 MMR 2 
Measles mumps and 
rubella 
Considered as 1 antigen even 
though it represents 3 anti-
gens due to the extensive use 
in this form. 
6 V 2 Varicella   
 
Table B 3 – Vaccines, investment, annuities and maximum number of doses [47] 
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle name 
Research and        
Development 
costs              
[$ M] 
Present value 
of   expected 
income           
[$ M] 
Annuity 
value        
[$ M] 
Maximum 
number of 
doses        
[u] 
1 DTaP 260.870 300.000 47.928 3 
2 HepB 173.913 200.000 31.952 3 
3 Hib 173.913 200.000 31.952 3 
4 IPV 173.913 200.000 31.952 3 
5 MMR 260.870 300.000 47.928 2 
6 V 695.652 800.000 127.809 2 
7 DTaP - HepB 608.696 700.000 111.833 3 
8 DTaP - Hib 608.696 700.000 111.833 3 
9 DTaP - IPV 608.696 700.000 111.833 3 
10 HepB - Hib 608.696 700.000 111.833 3 
11 MMR - V 869.565 1000.000 159.761 1 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 695.652 800.000 127.809 3 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 695.652 800.000 127.809 3 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 695.652 800.000 127.809 3 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 869.565 1000.000 159.761 3 
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Table B 4 – Vaccine Manufacturers and scores for supply capacity [21] 
Number Id Name Revenue [$ M] Score 
14 Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics  46,017.00 6 
13 Sanofi Pasteur 37,701.00 6 
12 Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.  37,519.00 6 
11 GlaxoSmithKline  33,055.00 6 
10 Serum Institute of India Ltd, India  588.11 5 
9 Shantha Biotechnics Private Ltd.  Acquired by Sanofi Company 2 
8 Bilthoven Biologicals B.V.  
Acquired by Serum Institute of 
India 
2 
7 
Berna Biotech Korea Corporation, a 
Crucell Company  
329.80 2 
6 LG Life Sciences Ltd.  396.00 2 
5 Statens Serum Institute  217.00 2 
4 Panacea Biotec  85.90 1 
3 Bio Farma  1 
2 Biological E Limited   1 
1 
Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology  
 1 
 
Table B 5 – Scores for supply capacity as a function of the manufacturer’s revenue 
Manufacturer Revenue Score 
0 – 100 M 1 
100 – 200 M 2 
200 – 300 M 3 
300 – 400 M 4 
400 – 500 M 5 
> 500 M 6 
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Table B 6 – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
1 Afghanistan 1077068.715 690 
2 Albania 36958.8007 4370 
3 Algeria 963698.2003 5010 
4 Andorra 752.571 41122.2 
5 Angola 962336.4471 4520 
6 Antigua and Barbuda 1493.301075 12850 
7 Argentina 700897.4661 11363.5 
8 Armenia 41326.64234 3700 
9 Australia 316871.41 59760 
10 Austria 79710.3362 50310 
11 Azerbaijan 177035.8588 6290 
12 Bahamas (the) 5813.069096 21480 
13 Bahrain 20753.89201 19700 
14 Bangladesh 3180600.273 950 
15 Barbados 3626.36456 15080 
16 Belarus 115485.2 6400 
17 Belgium 128602.3955 46900 
18 Belize 7884.2845 4420 
19 Benin 380781.3385 750 
20 Bhutan 14990.7282 2320 
21 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 276896.2976 2220 
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina 33824.26873 4600 
23 Botswana 48117.37521 7710 
24 Brazil 3031275.563 11640 
25 Brunei Darussalam 6651.956848 41326.3 
26 Bulgaria 69018.5925 7070 
27 Burkina Faso 701288.6178 690 
28 Burundi 457131.0144 240 
29 Cambodia 392258.175 880 
30 Cameroon 839708.6349 1220 
31 Canada 386697.069 50660 
32 Cape Verde 10163.52968 3530 
33 Central African Republic (the) 159192.5238 490 
34 Chad 595389.5518 1000 
35 Chile 247644.9959 14290 
36 China 16424298 5730 
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Table B 6 (Cont.) – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
37 Colombia 923567.0138 7020 
38 Comoros (the) 26357.06329 820 
39 Congo (the) 169050.0447 2480 
40 Cook Islands 201.39 14917.7 
41 Costa Rica 74607.47796 8850 
42 Côte d'Ivoire 744950.2414 1340 
43 Croatia 41705.86 13460 
44 Cuba 108307.7572 6197.7 
45 Cyprus 13171.33797 26410 
46 Czech Republic (the) 104042.7159 17063 
47 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the) 357598.6747 582.8 
48 Democratic Republic of the Congo (the) 2913215.163 400 
49 Denmark 58395.2928 60720 
50 Djibouti 24283.22238 1690.2 
51 Dominica 1118.20659 6820 
52 Dominican Republic (the) 220414.0805 5570 
53 Ecuador 332604.3137 5360 
54 Egypt 1929719.841 2980 
55 El Salvador 128343.4699 3600 
56 Equatorial Guinea 27115.48447 14040 
57 Eritrea 236555.2585 450 
58 Estonia 13970.7682 16500 
59 Ethiopia 3156609.86 420 
60 Fiji 18346.4165 4020 
61 Finland 59828.692 48590 
62 France 830842.3116 43160 
63 Gabon 53864.20013 10020 
64 Gambia (the) 79482.2693 520 
65 Georgia 60765.6624 3290 
66 Germany 677475.7332 46700 
67 Ghana 811901.9105 1580 
68 Greece 99247.941 23690 
69 Grenada 2055.990255 7160 
70 Guatemala 485485.0194 3130 
71 Guinea 438600.5928 440 
72 Guinea-Bissau 64506.05175 590 
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Table B 6 (Cont.) – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
73 Guyana 16538.39568 3440 
74 Haiti 268284.9384 760 
75 Honduras 211673.5643 2140 
76 Hungary 90034.4809 12830 
77 Iceland 4565.0724 40580 
78 India 25948088.85 1530 
79 Indonesia 4798419.578 3420 
80 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1471728.534 6570 
81 Iraq 1052516.824 6070 
82 Ireland 72181.6606 41460 
83 Israel 174085.2 32160 
84 Italy 542105.532 36240 
85 Jamaica 39445.08502 5190 
86 Japan 1044176.692 47830 
87 Jordan 178935.54 4660 
88 Kazakhstan 386530.3898 9780 
89 Kenya 1574777.799 1080 
90 Kiribati 2384.164194 2520 
91 Kuwait 70241.46334 59194.3 
92 Kyrgyzstan 157860.96 1040 
93 Lao People's Democratic Republic (the) 184623.9947 1260 
94 Latvia 19723.9406 14030 
95 Lebanon 59049.96102 9520 
96 Lesotho 57329.91474 1480 
97 Liberia 154655.4772 370 
98 Libya 131087.7509 15472.2 
99 Lithuania 30168.4278 13910 
100 Luxembourg 6139.968 69300 
101 Madagascar 800444.0975 430 
102 Malawi 656629.8137 320 
103 Malaysia 524266.6965 9820 
104 Maldives 7659.855623 5430 
105 Mali 724869.7638 660 
106 Malta 4149.0652 19990 
107 Marshall Islands (the) 1387.43224 4000 
108 Mauritania 134056.9344 1040 
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Table B 6 (Cont.) – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
109 Mauritius 14474.5095 9010 
110 Mexico 2296301.462 9720 
111 Micronesia (Federated States of) 2437.025715 3230 
112 Monaco 254.22432 151877.9 
113 Mongolia 64977.86375 3080 
114 Montenegro 7303.735782 6940 
115 Morocco 747172.4834 2910 
116 Mozambique 1018909.013 540 
117 Myanmar 928997.051 1125.9 
118 Namibia 60713.08009 5600 
119 Nauru 241.96328 12577.4 
120 Nepal 599257.578 700 
121 Netherlands (the) 176446.536 51760 
122 New Zealand 61256.559 35760 
123 Nicaragua 140714.4219 1690 
124 Niger (the) 888139.8962 390 
125 Nigeria 7210592.509 2460 
126 Niue 10.71 2585 
127 Norway 60961.992 98880 
128 Oman 77534.51718 25150 
129 Pakistan 4681793.236 1250 
130 Palau 265.6586 10550 
131 Panama 76309.62916 9030 
132 Papua New Guinea 214564.2254 1860 
133 Paraguay 162724.501 3310 
134 Peru 606813.4211 5680 
135 Philippines (the) 2419497.985 2960 
136 Poland 385144.79 12990 
137 Portugal 88887.0075 21200 
138 Qatar 24243.59547 79330 
139 Republic of Korea (the) 482108.8224 24640 
140 Republic of Moldova (the) 43574.64067 2150 
141 Romania 199813.58 8570 
142 Russian Federation (the) 1908548.151 12740 
143 Rwanda 421281.5215 610 
144 Saint Kitts and Nevis 739.16524 13080 
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Table B 6 (Cont.) – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
145 Saint Lucia 2864.967014 6920 
146 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1812.966848 6340 
147 Samoa 5097.400672 3800 
148 San Marino 311.3352 51732.4 
149 Sao Tome and Principe 6704.962806 1310 
150 Saudi Arabia 572656.6737 24660 
151 Senegal 538477.968 1030 
152 Serbia 66626.4276 5730 
153 Seychelles 1658.6178 11690 
154 Sierra Leone 226223.1131 520 
155 Singapore 54531.92 51090 
156 Slovakia 55757.9479 17400 
157 Slovenia 22041.4971 23290 
158 Solomon Islands 17650.71495 1490 
159 Somalia 463946.7509 122.9 
160 South Africa 1121091.464 7640 
161 South Sudan 412604.015 840 
162 Spain 452192.9025 30120 
163 Sri Lanka 371295.341 2910 
164 Sudan (the) 1288166.867 1580 
165 Suriname 9690.250444 8920 
166 Swaziland 37749.06745 3100 
167 Sweden 114244.5101 58600 
168 Switzerland 83305.1125 84410 
169 Syrian Arab Republic (the) 556517.598 2083.5 
170 Tajikistan 271301.745 880 
171 Thailand 702672.124 5250 
172 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 22706.73461 4710 
173 Timor-Leste 42380.99807 3940 
174 Togo 251083.081 490 
175 Tonga 2744.928026 4220 
176 Trinidad and Tobago 19747.10732 14780 
177 Tunisia 210109.45 4170 
178 Turkey 1283970.804 10810 
179 Turkmenistan 112682.5083 5410 
180 Tuvalu 234.45624 5650 
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Table B 6 (Cont.) – List of countries with corresponding GNI and annual births [60] 
Country 
ID 
Country Annual births GNI per capita 
181 Uganda 1640468.253 590 
182 Ukraine 518581.44 3640 
183 United Arab Emirates (the) 140836.8179 38360 
184 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the) 820566.7712 40600 
185 United Republic of Tanzania 1953575.99 780 
186 United States of America (the) 3983223.371 51920 
187 Uruguay 49644.3004 13670 
188 Uzbekistan 635107.2 1700 
189 Vanuatu 6801.094041 3010 
190 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 610475.7461 12460 
191 Viet Nam 1422244.901 1560 
192 Yemen 768246.7244 1220 
193 Zambia 625088.8268 1730 
194 Zimbabwe 447043.9789 820 
Table B 7 – GNI [USD] per market segment and number of market segments (m). 
Current market 
segmentation 
Number of Market segments (m) 
m = 2 m = 4 m = 8 m = 12 
HIC 
16445.41 
42317.93 
90632.42 
151877.90 
67802.54 
41776.46 
41043.13 
UMIC 7407.19 
11102.34 
11805.09 
8787.69 
5816.68 
5677.29 
LMIC 
1540.044 
1934.868 
3205.12 
3421.08 
2631.46 
1629.67 
1466.16 
LIC 618.3402 
778.04 
879.12 
498.05 
392.87 
238.86 
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Appendix C – Determination of vaccine baseline prices 
Table C 1 – Table of vaccines, market segments, corresponding GNI of the market segment, 
presence of antigens per vaccine and vaccine prices [53]. GNI is the weighted average of the 
GNI of the countries within a market segment (see Section 4.2). 
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.23 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.23 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.19 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.21 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.21 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.19 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.21 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.19 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.21 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.23 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.5 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.17 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.04 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.62 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 20.3 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.5 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.27 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 9.42 
HepB UMIC 7407.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.38 
MMR UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.25 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 22.58 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.7 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.04 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 9.15 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 9.16 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 2.65 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.38 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.25 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.25 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.25 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 17.5 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 53.78 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 53.78 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 10.21 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.51 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.76 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 50.46 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 38.06 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 43.39 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.56 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.92 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.51 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 44.76 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 59.15 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 19.26 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 10.49 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 10.56 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.61 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.71 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 1 1 0 0 47.87 
DTaP-Hib HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 0 0 0 21.21 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.12 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.94 
DTaP-Hib HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 0 0 0 41.67 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 12.28 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 44.49 
HepB UMIC 7407.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.49 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 1 1 1 0 0 30.73 
DTaP-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 0 1 1 0 0 13.44 
MMR UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.66 
DTaP UMIC 7407.18 1 0 0 0 0 0 9.21 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.38 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.98 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.41 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 29.79 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 20.44 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.63 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 33.71 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 17.85 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 12.94 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.8 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.23 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.97 
Hib UMIC 7407.18 0 0 1 0 0 0 4.03 
MMR UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.87 
HepB UMIC 7407.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.5 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 15.03 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 13.55 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 10.74 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 9.18 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 2.19 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 6.89 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.06 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.72 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 40.93 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 42.27 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 23.17 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 13.94 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 12.67 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.9 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.54 
HepB UMIC 7407.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.8 
DTaP-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 0 1 1 0 0 16.56 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 1 1 1 0 0 32.76 
DTaP-HepB-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 1 1 1 0 0 22.85 
MMR UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.56 
IPV UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.48 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 9.23 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.17 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 8.63 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 7.21 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.84 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 41.17 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 16.14 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 30.23 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 14.68 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 12.64 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 11.95 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 14.61 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 8.47 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 14.38 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 22.97 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 23.24 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 10.16 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 10.16 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.37 
DTaP-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 0 0 1 0 0 8.72 
Varicella UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 0 1 17.35 
DTaP-Hib-IPV UMIC 7407.18 1 0 1 1 0 0 7.98 
MMR UMIC 7407.18 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.41 
HepB UMIC 7407.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.16 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.98 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 9.5 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.9 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 10.5 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.9 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 10.8 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 
DTaP LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 
DTaP-Hib-IPV LMIC 1934.86 1 0 1 1 0 0 10 
DTaP-Hib-IPV LMIC 1934.86 1 0 1 1 0 0 11.5 
DTaP-IPV LMIC 1934.86 1 0 0 1 0 0 8.6 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 
HepB LMIC 1934.86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 3.2 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 3.5 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 3.2 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 2.3 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 3.6 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Hib LMIC 1934.86 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.7 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.1 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.5 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.5 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 2.9 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.1 
IPV LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 1 0 0 2.8 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.8 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.7 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.7 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.7 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.5 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.9 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.1 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.6 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.1 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MMR LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.4 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.9 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.5 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.9 
Varicella LMIC 1934.86 0 0 0 0 0 1 12.9 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.3 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
HepB LIC 618.34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.5 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.8 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.6 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.1 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.7 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.9 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.1 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 3.3 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.8 
MMR LIC 618.34 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 15.4 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 15.8 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 21 
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Table C 1 (Cont.)  
Vaccine Country 
GNI 
[USD] 
DTaP HepB Hib IPV MMR V 
Price 
[USD] 
DTaP HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 0 0 0 26 
DTaP-HepB-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 0 1 0 0 53.9 
DTaP-HepB-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 1 0 1 0 0 70.7 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 52.4 
DTaP-Hib-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 1 1 0 0 80.4 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 38.5 
DTaP-IPV HIC 42317.93 1 0 0 1 0 0 48 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 11.8 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 21.4 
HepB HIC 42317.93 0 1 0 0 0 0 24 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 9.4 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 12.3 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 22.8 
Hib HIC 42317.93 0 0 1 0 0 0 26.2 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 12.5 
IPV HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 1 0 0 27.4 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 19.9 
MMR HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 0 56.1 
MMR-V HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 1 103.2 
MMR-V HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 1 1 157.6 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 78.3 
Varicella HIC 42317.93 0 0 0 0 0 1 94.1 
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Table C 2 – Multiple linear regression 
Call:       
lm (formula = Price ~ GNI + DTaP + HepB + Hib + IPV + MMR + V,     
    data = data1)       
       
Residuals:      
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max        
-26.935  -2.962   0.195   1.612  92.420        
       
Coefficients:       
 Estimate Std.  Error  t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -1.35E+01 1.94E+00 -6.978 2.43E-11 ***  
GNI      3.71E-04 3.83E-05 9.669 <2.00E-16 *** 
DTaPTRUE  1.54E+01 2.14E+00 7.204 6.17E-12 ***  
HepBTRUE  1.24E+01 2.01E+00 6.145 2.95E-09 ***  
HibTRUE  9.45E+00 2.08E+00 4.536 8.72E-06 ***  
IPVTRUE  7.96E+00 2.16E+00 3.681 0.000282 ***  
MMRTRUE  1.54E+01 2.19E+00 7.033 1.75E-11 ***  
VTRUE   4.76E+01 3.33E+00 14.31 <2.00E-16 *** 
---       
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
   
       
Residual standard error: 11.17 on 263 degrees of freedom       
Multiple R-squared:  0.6374,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6277      
  
F-statistic: 66.04 on 7 and 263 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Table C 3 – Vaccine prices using coefficients from multiple linear regression. Note the negative 
values for some of the prices. Refer to chapter 4 – Vaccine baseline prices. 
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle Name 
GNI segmentation [USD] 
LGNIS LIC LMIC UMIC HIC HGNIS 
122.9 618.34 1934.87 7407.19 42317.93 151877.90 
1 DTaP 1.99 2.17 2.66 4.69 17.63 58.24 
2 HepB -1.09 -0.91 -0.42 1.61 14.55 55.16 
3 Hib -4.01 -3.83 -3.34 -1.31 11.63 52.25 
4 IPV -5.50 -5.32 -4.83 -2.80 10.14 50.76 
5 MMR 1.93 2.11 2.60 4.63 17.57 58.18 
6 V 34.17 34.35 34.84 36.87 49.81 90.42 
7 DTaP - HepB 14.35 14.53 15.02 17.05 29.99 70.60 
8 DTaP - Hib 11.43 11.61 12.10 14.13 27.07 67.69 
9 DTaP - IPV 9.94 10.12 10.61 12.64 25.58 66.20 
10 HepB - Hib 8.35 8.53 9.02 11.05 23.99 64.61 
11 MMR - V 49.55 49.73 50.22 52.25 65.19 105.80 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 23.79 23.97 24.46 26.49 39.43 80.05 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 22.30 22.48 22.97 25.00 37.94 78.56 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 19.39 19.57 20.06 22.09 35.03 75.64 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 31.75 31.93 32.42 34.45 47.39 88.00 
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Table C 4 – Vaccine prices using coefficients from multiple linear regression with a shift of 6 
units to all values to obtain positive prices for all vaccines. Refer to chapter 4 – Vaccine baseline 
prices.  
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle Name 
GNI segmentation [USD] 
LGNIS LIC LMIC UMIC HIC HGNIS 
122.9 618.34 1934.87 7407.19 42317.93 151877.90 
1 DTaP 7.99 8.17 8.66 10.69 23.63 64.24 
2 HepB 4.91 5.09 5.58 7.61 20.55 61.16 
3 Hib 1.99 2.17 2.66 4.69 17.63 58.25 
4 IPV 0.50 0.68 1.17 3.20 16.14 56.76 
5 MMR 7.93 8.11 8.60 10.63 23.57 64.18 
6 V 40.17 40.35 40.84 42.87 55.81 96.42 
7 DTaP - HepB 20.35 20.53 21.02 23.05 35.99 76.60 
8 DTaP - Hib 17.43 17.61 18.10 20.13 33.07 73.69 
9 DTaP - IPV 15.94 16.12 16.61 18.64 31.58 72.20 
10 HepB - Hib 14.35 14.53 15.02 17.05 29.99 70.61 
11 MMR - V 55.55 55.73 56.22 58.25 71.19 111.80 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 29.79 29.97 30.46 32.49 45.43 86.05 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 28.30 28.48 28.97 31.00 43.94 84.56 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 25.39 25.57 26.06 28.09 41.03 81.64 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 37.75 37.93 38.42 40.45 53.39 94.00 
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Table C 5 – Combination vaccine prices that come from the sum of the prices of their corresponding monovalent components 
or multi-antigen components. 
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle Name 
ID of Monovalent 
components  
GNI segmentation [USD] 
LGNIS LIC LMIC UMIC HIC HGNIS 
122.9 618.34 1934.87 7407.19 42317.93 151877.9 
7 DTaP - HepB 1,2 12.89 13.26 14.23 18.29 44.17 125.40 
8 DTaP - Hib 1,3 9.98 10.34 11.32 15.38 41.26 122.49 
9 DTaP - IPV 1,4 8.49 8.85 9.83 13.89 39.77 121.00 
10 HepB - Hib 2,3 6.90 7.26 8.24 12.30 38.18 119.41 
11 MMR - V 5,6 48.09 48.46 49.43 53.49 79.37 160.60 
12 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 1,2,3 14.88 15.43 16.90 22.98 61.81 183.65 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 3,7 22.34 22.70 23.68 27.74 53.62 134.85 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 2,8 22.34 22.70 23.68 27.74 53.62 134.85 
13 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 1,2,4 13.39 13.94 15.41 21.49 60.32 182.16 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 4,7 20.85 21.21 22.19 26.25 52.13 133.36 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 2,9 20.85 21.21 22.19 26.25 52.13 133.36 
14 
DTaP - Hib - IPV 1,3,4 10.48 11.03 12.49 18.58 57.40 179.24 
DTaP - Hib - IPV 4,8 17.93 18.30 19.27 23.33 49.21 130.44 
15 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 1,2,3,4 15.38 16.12 18.07 26.18 77.95 240.40 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 3,4,7 22.84 23.39 24.85 30.94 69.76 191.60 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 2,3,9 22.84 23.39 24.85 30.94 69.76 191.60 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 4,12 30.29 30.66 31.63 35.69 61.57 142.80 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 3,13 30.29 30.66 31.63 35.69 61.57 142.80 
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Table C 6 – The colors in the values refer to the group of values used to obtain the average increment factor. Since the 
average increment factor is very similar, 1.50 is adopted for all groups. 
Bundle 
ID 
Bundle Name 
Bundle ID of 
components 
of current 
bundle 
GNI segmentation [USD] Average 
Increment 
factor 
LGNIS LIC LMIC UMIC HIC HGNIS 
122.9 618.34 1934.87 7407.19 42317.93 151877.9 
7 DTaP - HepB 1,2 1.58 1.55 1.48 1.26 0.81 0.61 
1.49 
8 DTaP - Hib 1,3 1.75 1.70 1.60 1.31 0.80 0.60 
9 DTaP - IPV 1,4 1.88 1.82 1.69 1.34 0.79 0.60 
10 HepB - Hib 2,3 2.08 2.00 1.82 1.39 0.79 0.59 
11 MMR - V 5,6 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.09 0.90 0.70 
12 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 1,2,3 2.00 1.94 1.80 1.41 0.74 0.47 
1.48 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 3,7 1.33 1.32 1.29 1.17 0.85 0.64 
DTaP - HepB - Hib 2,8 1.33 1.32 1.29 1.17 0.85 0.64 
13 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 1,2,4 2.11 2.04 1.88 1.44 0.73 0.46 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 4,7 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.18 0.84 0.63 
DTaP - HepB - IPV 2,9 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.18 0.84 0.63 
14 
DTaP - Hib - IPV 1,3,4 2.42 2.32 2.09 1.51 0.71 0.46 
DTaP - Hib - IPV 4,8 1.42 1.40 1.35 1.20 0.83 0.63 
15 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 1,2,3,4 2.45 2.35 2.13 1.54 0.68 0.39 
1.48 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 3,4,7 1.65 1.62 1.55 1.31 0.77 0.49 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 2,3,9 1.65 1.62 1.55 1.31 0.77 0.49 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 4,12 1.25 1.24 1.21 1.13 0.87 0.66 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 3,13 1.25 1.24 1.21 1.13 0.87 0.66 
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Table C 7 – Linear Regression DTaP 
Call:      
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = DTaP)      
      
Residuals:     
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max       
-13.5970  -0.8470  -0.0947   1.2530   9.7530       
      
Coefficients:      
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)          
(Intercept) 8.65E+00 1.36E+00 6.355 4.26E-06 *** 
GNI 1.80E-04 5.19E-05 3.459 2.63E-03 ** 
---      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
       
Residual standard error: 4.625 on 19 degrees of freedom      
Multiple R-squared:  0.3864,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.3541       
F-statistic: 11.97 on 1 and 19 DF,  p-value: 0.002627   
Table C 8 – Linear Regression HepB 
Call:      
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = HepB)      
      
Residuals:     
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max       
-7.0272 -0.2364  0.0499  0.1499 14.7828       
      
Coefficients:      
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)          
(Intercept) 1.57E-02 3.88E-01 0.04 0.968  
GNI 2.17E-04 1.95E-05 11.18 <2e-16 *** 
---      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
       
Residual standard error: 2.805 on 71 degrees of freedom      
Multiple R-squared:  0.6376,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6325       
F-statistic: 124.9 on 1 and 71 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16   
Table C 9 - Linear Regression Hib 
Call:      
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = Hib)     
      
Residuals:     
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max       
-7.6543 -2.7668 -0.3015  0.8636 11.6557       
      
Coefficients:      
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)          
(Intercept) 2.09E+00 1.74E+00 1.201 0.245  
GNI 2.94E-04 5.54E-05 5.314 4.73E-05 *** 
---      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
       
Residual standard error: 4.908 on 18 degrees of freedom      
Multiple R-squared:  0.6107,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.5891       
F-statistic: 28.24 on 1 and 18 DF,  p-value: 4.727e-05  
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Table C 10 – Linear Regression IPV 
Call:        
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = IPV)   
 
Residuals:      
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max    
-5.8253 -2.1264 -0.2975  1.1704 16.6347    
 
Coefficients:       
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)  4.12E+00 1.85E+00 2.229 0.0405 *   
GNI    1.57E-04 5.84E-05 2.691 0.0161 *   
---        
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
        
Residual standard error: 4.896 on 16 degrees of freedom  
Multiple R-squared:  0.3116,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.2685  
F-statistic: 7.241 on 1 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.01607  
Table C 11 – Linear Regression MMR 
Call:      
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = MMR)     
      
Residuals:     
   Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max       
-5.897 -1.290 -0.590  0.526 44.363       
      
Coefficients:      
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)          
(Intercept) 1.73E+00 7.11E-01 2.435 0.0171 * 
GNI 2.36E-04 3.59E-05 6.592 4.09E-09 *** 
---      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
  
      
Residual standard error: 5.463 on 81 degrees of freedom      
Multiple R-squared:  0.3491,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.3411       
F-statistic: 43.45 on 1 and 81 DF,  p-value: 4.089e-09     
Table C 12 – Linear Regression  V 
Call:      
lm(formula = Price ~ GNI, data = Varicella)      
      
Residuals:     
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max       
-22.988  -6.238  -1.171   1.306  37.402       
      
Coefficients:      
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)          
(Intercept) 7.4183409 6.5658646 1.13 0.282581  
GNI 0.0011645 0.0002276 5.117 0.000335 *** 
---      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1    
  
      
Residual standard error: 16.24 on 11 degrees of freedom      
Multiple R-squared:  0.7042,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6773       
F-statistic: 26.19 on 1 and 11 DF,  p-value: 0.0003349     
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Table C 13 – Generated prices used to get the coefficients of the mathematical expressions per vaccine as a function of the 
GNI. 
Procedure Number Vaccine 
GNI-based segmentation [USD] 
Increment 
factor 
LGNIS LIC LMIC UMIC HIC HGNIS 
122.90 618.34 1934.87 7407.19 42317.93 151877.90 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 o
f 
p
ri
ce
 a
s 
a 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 o
f 
G
N
I 1 DTaP 8.67 8.76 8.99 9.98 16.25 35.92 
1 
2 HepB 0.04 0.15 0.44 1.63 9.22 33.03 
3 Hib 2.13 2.27 2.66 4.27 14.55 46.79 
4 IPV 4.14 4.21 4.42 5.28 10.76 27.98 
5 MMR 1.76 1.88 2.19 3.48 11.74 37.64 
6 V 7.56 8.14 9.67 16.04 56.70 184.28 
S
u
m
 o
f 
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
’ 
p
ri
ce
 t
im
es
 
th
e 
in
cr
em
en
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
7 DTaP - HepB 13.07 13.36 14.15 17.40 38.19 103.44 1.50 
8 DTaP - Hib 16.20 16.55 17.48 21.37 46.19 124.07 1.50 
9 DTaP - IPV 19.21 19.46 20.12 22.89 40.52 95.85 1.50 
10 HepB - Hib 3.26 3.64 4.65 8.85 35.64 119.74 1.50 
11 MMR - V 13.99 15.03 17.79 29.29 102.65 332.88 1.50 
12 DTaP - HepB - Hib 16.26 16.77 18.14 23.81 60.01 173.62 1.50 
13 DTaP - HepB - IPV 19.27 19.68 20.78 25.32 54.34 145.40 1.50 
14 DTaP - Hib - IPV 22.40 22.87 24.11 29.29 62.34 166.03 1.50 
15 DTaP - HepB - Hib - IPV 22.46 23.09 24.77 31.73 76.16 215.59 1.50 
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Table C 14 – Differences between prices from real and generated prices after the procedure described to generate baseline 
prices. Blue cells represent the values of the generated prices and red cells represent the major deviations between prices. 
Vaccine 
LIC 
Data 
LIC 
Model 
LMIC 
Data 
LMIC 
Model 
UMIC 
Data 
UMIC 
Model 
HIC 
Data 
USA  
Public 
USA 
Private 
HIC 
Model 
DTaP   8.76 8.87 8.99 9.21 9.98 17.50 15.76 20.96 16.25 
HepB 0.27 0.15 0.45 0.44 1.80 1.63 10.74 11.08 21.37 9.22 
Hib   2.27 2.25 2.66 4.03 4.27 14.61 12.34 22.77 14.55 
IPV   4.21 4.5 4.42 6.48 5.28 10.56 12.46 27.44 10.76 
MMR 1.75 1.88 2.05 2.19 3.66 3.48 7.63 19.91 56.14 11.74 
V   8.14 9.9 9.67 17.35 16.04 42.27 78.34 94.14 56.7 
DTaP - HepB   13.36   14.15   17.4       38.19 
DTaP - Hib   16.55   17.48   21.37 41.67     46.19 
DTaP - IPV   19.46 8.6 20.12 8.72 22.89 30.23 38.50 48.00 40.52 
HepB - Hib   3.64   4.65   8.85       35.64 
MMR - V   15.03   17.79   29.29   103.16 157.64 102.65 
DTaP - HepB - Hib   16.77   18.14   23.81       60.01 
DTaP - HepB - IPV   19.68   20.78   25.32   53.86 70.72 54.34 
DTaP - Hib - IPV   22.87 11.5 24.11 16.56 29.29 44.49 52.43 80.43 62.34 
DTaP - HepB - Hib - 
IPV 
  23.09   24.77 30.73 31.73 59.15     76.16 
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Appendix D – Statistical analyses 
Table D 1 – Analysis of variance for the variable response Market Value (MV) considering the 
control variables number of market segments (m), uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i). 
General Factorial Regression: MV versus m [u], n [%], i [%]  
Factor Information 
Factor  Levels  Values 
m [u]        4  2, 4, 8, 12 
n [%]        4  5, 10, 15, 20 
i [%]        3  5, 10, 15 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source                   DF       Adj SS       Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Model                    47  6.82778E+20  1.45272E+19   472.82    0.000 
  Linear                  8  6.80134E+20  8.50168E+19  2767.06    0.000 
    m [u]                 3  2.09846E+18  6.99488E+17    22.77    0.000 
    n [%]                 3  6.71889E+20  2.23963E+20  7289.37    0.000 
    i [%]                 2  6.02802E+18  3.01401E+18    98.10    0.000 
  2-Way Interactions     21  2.21572E+18  1.05510E+17     3.43    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]           9  1.80023E+18  2.00026E+17     6.51    0.000 
    m [u]*i [%]           6  1.14864E+17  1.91440E+16     0.62    0.712 
    n [%]*i [%]           6  3.02197E+17  5.03662E+16     1.64    0.132 
  3-Way Interactions     18  4.86122E+17  2.70068E+16     0.88    0.605 
    m [u]*n [%]*i [%]    18  4.86122E+17  2.70068E+16     0.88    0.605 
Error                  2351  7.22336E+19  3.07246E+16 
Total                  2398  7.55012E+20 
 
Model Summary 
        S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 
175284420  90.43%     90.24%      90.04% 
ANOVA Validity conditions 
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Main effects 
 
 
 
Interaction effects 
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Logistics regression 
 
Call: 
glm(formula = MV ~ n_markets + unc_range + interest_rate, family = binom
ial,data = data2, na.action = na.omit) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-3.1709  -0.0946   0.0123   0.1472   1.7364   
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)   -9.24391    0.65299 -14.156  < 2e-16 *** 
n_markets      0.01562    0.02176   0.718    0.473     
unc_range      0.99271    0.06167  16.098  < 2e-16 *** 
interest_rate -0.13144    0.02107  -6.238 4.44e-10 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 3244.49  on 2399  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance:  877.04  on 2396  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 885.04 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 8 
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Kruskal – Wallis Test 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=2 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 174.92, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=4 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 178.59, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=8 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 184.46, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=12 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 183.44, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=2 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 178.57, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=4 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 179.5, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=8 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 180.41, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=12 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 183.99, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=2 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 176.68, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=4 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 181.76, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=8 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 184.41, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for m=12 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 184.91, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
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Table D 2 – Analysis of variance for the variable response Customer Surplus for Target group of 
countries with respect to Market Value (𝐶𝑆𝑇/𝑀𝑉) considering the control variables number of 
market segments (m), uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i). 
General Factorial Regression: CS_T/MV versus m [u], n [%], i [%]  
Factor Information 
Factor  Levels  Values 
m [u]        4  2, 4, 8, 12 
n [%]        4  5, 10, 15, 20 
i [%]        3  5, 10, 15 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source                   DF   Adj SS    Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Model                    47  0.65005  0.013831    69.55    0.000 
  Linear                  8  0.61759  0.077199   388.22    0.000 
    m [u]                 3  0.56910  0.189700   953.96    0.000 
    n [%]                 3  0.00176  0.000587     2.95    0.031 
    i [%]                 2  0.04700  0.023498   118.16    0.000 
  2-Way Interactions     21  0.02698  0.001285     6.46    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]           9  0.00373  0.000415     2.09    0.028 
    m [u]*i [%]           6  0.02209  0.003682    18.52    0.000 
    n [%]*i [%]           6  0.00117  0.000195     0.98    0.438 
  3-Way Interactions     18  0.00617  0.000343     1.73    0.029 
    m [u]*n [%]*i [%]    18  0.00617  0.000343     1.73    0.029 
Error                  2351  0.46751  0.000199 
Total                  2398  1.11756 
Model Summary 
S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 
0.0141016  58.17%     57.33%      56.44% 
ANOVA Validity conditions 
 
CS_T / MV 
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Main Effects 
 
 
 
Interation Effects 
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Logistic Regression 
 
Call: 
glm(formula = CS_T.MV ~ n_markets + unc_range + interest_rate, family = bin
omial, data = data2, na.action = na.omit) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-4.2507  -0.4886   0.0287   0.2294   1.7702   
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)   -1.56188    0.25703  -6.077 1.23e-09 *** 
n_markets      0.98614    0.04949  19.924  < 2e-16 *** 
unc_range     -0.05052    0.01203  -4.200 2.67e-05 *** 
interest_rate -0.14653    0.01699  -8.622  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 3007.5  on 2399  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 1391.6  on 2396  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 1399.6 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 7 
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Kruskal – Wallis tests 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 173.82, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 153.09, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 150.21, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 147.26, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 160.08, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 123.26, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 126.16, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 135.84, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 163.41, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 147.63, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 141.02, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 138.76, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
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Table D 3 – Analysis of variance for the variable response Customer Surplus for Non-target 
group of countries with respect to Market Value (𝐶𝑆𝑁/𝑀𝑉) considering the control variables 
number of market segments (m), uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i). 
General Factorial Regression: CS_N/MV versus m [u], n [%], i [%]  
Factor Information 
Factor  Levels  Values 
m [u]        4  2, 4, 8, 12 
n [%]        4  5, 10, 15, 20 
i [%]        3  5, 10, 15 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source                   DF   Adj SS    Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Model                    47  1.14842  0.024435   131.57    0.000 
  Linear                  8  1.13346  0.141682   762.92    0.000 
    m [u]                 3  1.00931  0.336438  1811.64    0.000 
    n [%]                 3  0.00206  0.000686     3.70    0.011 
    i [%]                 2  0.12255  0.061276   329.95    0.000 
  2-Way Interactions     21  0.01068  0.000509     2.74    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]           9  0.00318  0.000353     1.90    0.047 
    m [u]*i [%]           6  0.00503  0.000839     4.52    0.000 
    n [%]*i [%]           6  0.00247  0.000411     2.22    0.039 
  3-Way Interactions     18  0.00423  0.000235     1.27    0.200 
    m [u]*n [%]*i [%]    18  0.00423  0.000235     1.27    0.200 
Error                  2351  0.43660  0.000186 
Total                  2398  1.58503 
Model Summary 
        S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 
0.0136275  72.45%     71.90%      71.32% 
ANOVA Validity conditions 
 
CS_N / MV 
90 
Main Effects 
 
 
 
Interation Effects 
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Logistic Regression 
 
Call: 
glm(formula = CS_N.MV ~ n_markets + unc_range + interest_rate, family = bin
omial,  
    data = data2, na.action = na.omit) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-4.4073  -0.2319   0.0618   0.3377   2.0368   
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)    1.860041   0.268113   6.938 3.99e-12 *** 
n_markets      0.856460   0.040890  20.945  < 2e-16 *** 
unc_range     -0.004995   0.012905  -0.387    0.699     
interest_rate -0.475062   0.024471 -19.413  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 2901.0  on 2399  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 1240.8  on 2396  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 1248.8 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 7 
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Kruskal – Wallis tests 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 166.75, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 157.8, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 159.76, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 159.36, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 168.59, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 127.55, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 148.03, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 142.07, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 169.67, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 157.93, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 146.94, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 142.63, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
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Table D 4 – Analysis of variance for the variable response Total Profit with respect to Market 
Value (ܶܲ/ܯܸሻ considering the control variables number of market segments (m), uncertainty 
range (n) and interest rate (i). 
General Factorial Regression: TP/MV versus m [u], n [%], i [%]  
Factor Information 
Factor  Levels  Values 
m [u]        4  2, 4, 8, 12 
n [%]        4  5, 10, 15, 20 
i [%]        3  5, 10, 15 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source                   DF   Adj SS   Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value 
Model                    47  3.56794  0.07591   140.58    0.000 
  Linear                  8  3.53410  0.44176   818.05    0.000 
    m [u]                 3  3.19512  1.06504  1972.22    0.000 
    n [%]                 3  0.01336  0.00445     8.25    0.000 
    i [%]                 2  0.32458  0.16229   300.52    0.000 
  2-Way Interactions     21  0.02732  0.00130     2.41    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]           9  0.01033  0.00115     2.13    0.024 
    m [u]*i [%]           6  0.01405  0.00234     4.34    0.000 
    n [%]*i [%]           6  0.00297  0.00049     0.92    0.482 
  3-Way Interactions     18  0.00745  0.00041     0.77    0.742 
    m [u]*n [%]*i [%]    18  0.00745  0.00041     0.77    0.742 
Error                  2351  1.26959  0.00054 
Total                  2398  4.83753 
Model Summary 
        S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 
0.0232383  73.76%     73.23%      72.67% 
ANOVA Validity conditions 
 
 
0.30.20.10.0-0.1
99.99
99
90
50
10
1
0.01
Residual
Pe
rce
nt
0.400.350.300.25
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
Fitted Value
Re
sid
ua
l
0.240.180.120.060.00-0.06-0.12
1000
750
500
250
0
Residual
Fre
qu
en
cy
220
0
200
0
180
0
160
0
140
0
120
0
100
08006004002001
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
O bservation O rder
Re
sid
ua
l
Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for TP/MV
94 
Main effects 
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Logistics Regression 
 
Call: 
glm(formula = TP.MV ~ n_markets + unc_range + interest_rate, family = binom
ial, data = data2, na.action = na.omit) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-2.0440  -0.2621  -0.0604  -0.0107   5.0102   
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)   -0.50416    0.36979  -1.363    0.173     
n_markets     -0.73779    0.05194 -14.204   <2e-16 *** 
unc_range      0.38859    0.02594  14.981   <2e-16 *** 
interest_rate -0.47194    0.03278 -14.395   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 1831.71  on 2399  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance:  781.34  on 2396  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 789.34 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 8 
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Kruskal – Wallis tests 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 183.99, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 171.72, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 170.07, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=5%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 163.7, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 181.68, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 145.94, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 155.77, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=10%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 151.97, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 180.95, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 180.95, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 159.71, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and i=15%: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 153.87, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16 
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Table D 5 – Analysis of variance for the variable response Total Annuities with respect to 
Market Value (ܶܣ/ܯܸሻ considering the control variables number of market segments (m), 
uncertainty range (n) and interest rate (i). 
General Factorial Regression: TA/MV versus m [u], n [%], i [%]  
Factor Information 
Factor  Levels  Values 
m [u]        4  2, 4, 8, 12 
n [%]        4  5, 10, 15, 20 
i [%]        3  5, 10, 15 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source                   DF   Adj SS    Adj MS   F-Value  P-Value 
Model                    47  1.31516  0.027982   3645.49    0.000 
  Linear                  8  1.30309  0.162886  21220.65    0.000 
    m [u]                 3  0.00217  0.000724     94.33    0.000 
    n [%]                 3  0.01159  0.003863    503.28    0.000 
    i [%]                 2  1.28911  0.644556  83972.19    0.000 
  2-Way Interactions     21  0.01004  0.000478     62.31    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]           9  0.00057  0.000063      8.24    0.000 
    m [u]*i [%]           6  0.00362  0.000603     78.54    0.000 
    n [%]*i [%]           6  0.00586  0.000976    127.20    0.000 
  3-Way Interactions     18  0.00205  0.000114     14.84    0.000 
    m [u]*n [%]*i [%]    18  0.00205  0.000114     14.84    0.000 
Error                  2351  0.01805  0.000008 
Total                  2398  1.33321 
Model Summary 
        S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred) 
0.0027705  98.65%     98.62%      98.59% 
ANOVA Validity conditions 
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Main effects 
 
  
Interaction effects 
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Logistic Regression 
 
Call: 
glm(formula = TA/MV ~ n_markets + unc_range + interest_rate, family = binom
ial,  
    data = data2, na.action = na.omit) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
     Min        1Q    Median        3Q       Max   
-1.57851   0.00000   0.00000   0.00006   1.91550   
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)   -21.34855  482.40873  -0.044    0.965     
n_markets       0.14932    0.02055   7.265 3.73e-13 *** 
unc_range      -0.09151    0.01433  -6.384 1.72e-10 *** 
interest_rate   4.18417   96.48173   0.043    0.965     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 2466.99  on 2399  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance:  958.37  on 2396  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 966.37 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 20 
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Kruskal – Wallis tests 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and m=2: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 149, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and m=2: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 149, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and m=2: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 149, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and m=2: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 146.98, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and m=4: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 142.65, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and m=4: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 139.92, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and m=4: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 139.55, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and m=4: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 139.69, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and m=8: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 138.78, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and m=8: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 136.06, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and m=8: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 135.71, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and m=8: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 138.91, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=5 and m=12: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 136.32, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=10 and m=12: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 135.71, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=15 and m=12: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 135.46, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for n=20 and m=12: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 135.47, df = 2, p-value < 2.2e-16 
 
Non Parametrical Test for i=15 and n=20: 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 5.756, df = 3, p-value = 0.1241 
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Appendix E – AMPL code 
###################################################################################
# 
# ABP model complete 7-3-2015 
###################################################################################
# 
reset; 
model ABP.mod; 
######################################Con-
trols###################################### 
param num_experiments_from := 1; 
param num_experiments_to := 1; 
param feasible_required:= 1; 
param unc_range; 
param interest_rate; 
 
set UNC_RANGE; 
set INTEREST_RATE; 
data; 
set UNC_RANGE:= 5 10 15 20 ; 
set INTEREST_RATE:= 5 10 15 20 ; 
 
let n_markets := 8 ; 
param ROI := 1.15; 
param num_y := 20; 
param stochastic symbolic := 'True'; 
param accros_markets symbolic := 'False'; 
param title symbolic; 
let title:= 'False'; 
 
param knitro_options_values_discrete symbolic :=      "ms_enable=1 
outlev=0 outmode=0 outappend=0 presolve_dbg=0 ms_maxsolves=2  algorithm=5 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=1 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-3 feastol=1e-6 feastol_abs=1e-6"; 
param knitro_options_values_discrete_second_try symbolic :=   "ms_enable=1 
outlev=0 outmode=0 outappend=0 presolve_dbg=0 ms_maxsolves=20 algorithm=0 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=1 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-3 feastol=1e-6 feastol_abs=1e-6"; 
param knitro_options_values_continuous symbolic :=      "ms_enable=1 
outlev=0 outmode=0 outappend=0 presolve_dbg=0 ms_maxsolves=2  algorithm=5 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=2 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-6 feastol=1e-6 feastol_abs=1e-6"; 
param knitro_options_values_continuous_second_try symbolic :=   "ms_enable=1 
outlev=0 outmode=0 outappend=0 presolve_dbg=0 ms_maxsolves=20 algorithm=0 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=2 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-6 feastol=1e-6 feastol_abs=1e-6"; 
param knitro_options_values_continuous_last symbolic :=    "ms_enable=1 
outlev=0 outmode=0 outappend=0 presolve_dbg=0 ms_maxsolves=50 algorithm=0 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=2 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-6 feastol=1e-3 feastol_abs=1e-3"; 
param knitro_options_values_continuous_infeasible symbolic :=   "ms_enable=1 
outlev=6 outmode=1 outappend=1 presolve_dbg=2 ms_maxsolves=50 algorithm=0 ma_termi-
nate=1 bar_feasible=2 mip_integral_gap_rel=1e-6 feastol=1e-3 feastol_abs=1e-3"; 
 
option presolve 0; 
option display_round 4; 
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option display_eps 1e-07; 
option omit_zero_cols 1; 
option omit_zero_rows 1; 
option display_1col 20000; 
option randseed 0; 
option solver knitro; 
option knitro_auxfiles rc; 
option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_discrete ); 
 
param antigen{B,COEFFICIENTS}; 
param coefficients{COEFFICIENTS}; 
param GNI_coef{b in B}; 
param Intercept{b in B}; 
param d_original {A,M}; 
param R_original {B,M}; 
param interval_step; 
param uncertainty{M}; 
param savings_market_bundle{M,B}; 
param profit_producer{P}; 
param profit_producer_bundle{P,B}; 
param TVPC; 
param ANNUITIES; 
param MV; 
param GNI_low_2{M}; 
param GNI_low_4{M}; 
param GNI_low_8{M}; 
param GNI_low_12{M}; 
param GNI_high_2{M}; 
param GNI_high_4{M}; 
param GNI_high_8{M}; 
param GNI_high_12{M}; 
param GNI{M}; 
param RD_cost{B}; 
param profit_bundle{B}; 
param savings_bundle{B}; 
param cost_bundle{B}; 
param surplus_bundle{B}; 
param savings_market{M}; 
param cost_market{M}; 
 
param cost_per_child{M}; 
param savings_per_child{M}; 
 
set COUNTRIES:=1..194; 
set GROUPS:= 1..4; 
set HIC within COUNTRIES := 1..57; 
set UMIC within COUNTRIES := 58..109; 
set LMIC within COUNTRIES := 110..158; 
set LIC within COUNTRIES := 159..194; 
param GNI_low{M}; 
param GNI_high{M}; 
param no_target_markets:= 2; 
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param target_markets:=2; 
param annual_births{COUNTRIES}; 
param GNI_country{COUNTRIES}; 
param countries2{COUNTRIES,M} binary default 0; 
param countries4{COUNTRIES,M} binary default 0; 
param countries8{COUNTRIES,M} binary default 0; 
param countries12{COUNTRIES,M} binary default 0; 
param cost_per_country{COUNTRIES}; 
param savings_per_country{COUNTRIES}; 
param Cost_LIC; 
param Cost_HIC; 
param Savings_LIC; 
param Savings_HIC; 
param affordable symbolic; 
param delta_affordability_LIC; 
param positive_impact symbolic; 
param delta_affordability_HIC; 
param annuity{B}; 
param initial_time; 
param current_time; 
param total_time; 
param feasible symbolic; 
param feasible_experiments; 
param i; 
 
 
#       Controls                                   # 
###################################################################################
## 
###################################################################################
## 
 
###################################################################################
## 
###################################################################################
## 
#        Changes in parameters according to controls   # 
data ABP.dat; 
#### problem or environment definitions ##### 
 
problem TSS_ABP_R: X,Y,g, TSS_R,antigen_demand_R,production_capacity_R,recover_an-
nuity_R,price_bound_R,segmented_prices_R,reserv_prices_R,non_negativity_R; 
problem TSS_ABP_r: X,Y,g, TSS_R,antigen_demand_r,production_capacity_R,recover_an-
nuity_R,price_bound_R,segmented_prices_R,reserv_prices_R,non_negativity_R; 
problem TP_ABP: X,Y,g, TP,SuperAdditivity,antigen_demand,recover_annu-
ity,price_bound,segmented_prices,reserv_prices;  
problem TCS_ABP: X,Y,g, TCS,SuperAdditivity,antigen_demand,recover_annu-
ity,price_bound,segmented_prices,reserv_prices,high_price; 
problem TSS_ABP: X,Y,g, TSS,SuperAdditivity,antigen_demand,recover_annu-
ity,price_bound,segmented_prices,reserv_prices,between_bounds,equilibrium;  
 
for {interest in INTEREST_RATE} 
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{ 
let interest_rate:= interest; 
for {range in UNC_RANGE} 
{ 
let unc_range:= range; 
 
if n_markets = 2 then  
{   
 let {m in M} l[m]:= sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_2[m]} annual_births[c]; 
 let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_2[m]} GNI_country[c] * annual_births[c]) / (sum{c in COUN-
TRIES:GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] <= GNI_high_2[m]} annual_births[c]); #Weighted 
average of GNI considering population 
 #let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_2[m]} GNI_country[c])/card({c in COUNTRIES:GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] 
<= GNI_high_2[m]}); #Average GNI 
} 
if n_markets = 4 then  
{  
 let {m in M} l[m]:= sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_4[m]} annual_births[c]; 
 let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_4[m]} GNI_country[c] * annual_births[c]) / (sum{c in COUN-
TRIES:GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] <= GNI_high_4[m]} annual_births[c]); #Weighted 
average of GNI considering population 
 #let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_4[m]} GNI_country[c]) / card({c in COUNTRIES:GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] 
<= GNI_high_4[m]}); #Average GNI 
} 
if n_markets = 8 then  
{  
 let {m in M} l[m]:= sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_8[m]} annual_births[c]; 
 let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_8[m]} GNI_country[c] * annual_births[c]) / (sum{c in COUN-
TRIES:GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] <= GNI_high_8[m]} annual_births[c]); #Weighted 
average of GNI considering population 
 #let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_8[m]} GNI_country[c]) / card({c in COUNTRIES:GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] 
<= GNI_high_8[m]}); #Average GNI 
} 
if n_markets = 12 then  
{  
 let {m in M} l[m]:= sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_12[m]} annual_births[c]; 
 let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_12[m]} GNI_country[c] * annual_births[c]) / (sum{c in COUN-
TRIES:GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_country[c] <= GNI_high_12[m]} annual_births[c]); 
#Weighted average of GNI considering population 
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 #let {m in M} GNI[m]:= (sum{c in COUNTRIES: GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_12[m]} GNI_country[c]) / card({c in COUNTRIES:GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_coun-
try[c] <= GNI_high_12[m]}); #Average GNI 
} 
 
let {a in A, m in M:a=1} d[a,m]:=3; 
let {a in A, m in M:a=2} d[a,m]:=3; 
let {a in A, m in M:a=3} d[a,m]:=3; 
let {a in A, m in M:a=4} d[a,m]:=3; 
let {a in A, m in M:a=5} d[a,m]:=2; 
let {a in A, m in M:a=6} d[a,m]:=2; 
 
let {b in B, m in M:b=1} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=2} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=3} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=4} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=5} D[b,m]:=2; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=6} D[b,m]:=2; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=7} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=8} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=9} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=10} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=11} D[b,m]:=1; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=12} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=13} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=14} D[b,m]:=3; 
let {b in B, m in M:b=15} D[b,m]:=3; 
 
let {b in B} annuity[b] := interest_rate/100*round(RD_cost[b]*ROI)/(1-(1+inter-
est_rate/100)^-num_y); 
let {p in P, b in B2[p]} C[b,p] := annuity[b];   
 
let interval_step := unc_range/n_markets; 
 
if stochastic = 'True' then  
 { 
 reset data R; 
 if accros_markets = 'True' then 
  { 
  let {m in M:m = first(M)} uncertainty[m] := 1 + (unc_range/100); 
  let {m in M:m <> first(M)} uncertainty[m] := uncertainty[m-1]-(inter-
val_step/100); 
  } 
 else let {m in M} uncertainty[m] := 1 + (unc_range/100); 
 }  
else let {m in M} uncertainty[m] := 1 + (unc_range/100); 
 
let {b in B, m in M} R[b,m]:= Intercept[b]+GNI_coef[b]*GNI[m]; 
let {a in A, m in M} d_original[a,m] := d[a,m]; 
let {b in B, m in M} R_original[b,m] := R[b,m]; 
 
let feasible_experiments := 0; 
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let initial_time := 0; 
let i:= num_experiments_from; 
 
repeat  
{  
 option randseed 0; 
 let current_time := _total_solve_time; 
 print 
"##################################################################################
"; 
 print 
"##################################################################################
"; 
 print "Experiment number = ",i; 
 print 
"##################################################################################
"; 
 print 
"##################################################################################
"; 
 option omit_zero_rows 1; 
 option display_round 2; 
 print "############### ABP ################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "#################### Settings of the experiment ####################" 
>>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
 display  n_markets, unc_range, interest_rate, ROI , num_y, stochastic, ac-
cros_markets, uncertainty >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "######################## Initial values for parameters 
##########################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 option display_round 4; 
 display l, GNI, C, S, annuity >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets 
&" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 let {a in A, m in M} d[a,m] := d_original[a,m];  
 display d >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display D,delta,phi,alpha >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ############################# Changing Reservation prices 
####################################### 
 if stochastic = 'True' then let {b in B, m in M} R[b,m] := Uniform(R_origi-
nal[b,m],R_original[b,m]*uncertainty[m]); #Use this line if the Reservation prices 
are sampled form a uniform probability distribution 
 if stochastic = 'False' then let {b in B, m in M} R[b,m] := R_original[b,m]*un-
certainty[m]; #Use this line if you want to fix the range for uncertainty of reser-
vation prices. For example all markets with 10% above baseline price 
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 print "############### Instances of reservation prices for the model 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display {b in B, m in M} (R[b,m], R_original[b,m], R[b,m]/R_original[b,m]) >> ( 
"Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
 ###################### Reseting environments and unfixing variables 
############################# 
 print "############### Unfixing variables for TP_ABP environment 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TP_ABP; 
 unfix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]} X[b,m,p]; 
 unfix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "############### Unfixing variables for TCS_ABP environment 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TCS_ABP; 
 unfix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]} X[b,m,p]; 
 unfix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "############### Unfixing variables for TSS_ABP environment 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TSS_ABP; 
 unfix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]} X[b,m,p]; 
 unfix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "############### Unfixing variables for TSS_ABP_r environment 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TSS_ABP_r; 
 unfix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]} X[b,m,p]; 
 unfix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "############### Unfixing variables for TSS_ABP_R environment 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TSS_ABP_R; 
 unfix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]} X[b,m,p]; 
 unfix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ###################### Reseting last values assigned to variables 
############################# 
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 print "############### Checking the initial value for all the variables 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 reset data X,Y,g; 
 display X,Y,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Setting up environment TSS_ABP_R 
#################################### 
 print "############### Setting up environment TSS_ABP_R ################" >>( 
"Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TSS_ABP_R; 
 show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Initializing loop for all vaccines on combination 
vaccines ##################### 
 for {vaccine in CV}  
 { 
  print "############### ABP_R for a specific vaccine ################" >>( 
"Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
  print 
"##############################################################################"; 
  let current_bundle := vaccine; 
  printf "Bundle number = %d \n", vaccine>> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  printf "Current antigen demand = \n" >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display d >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  printf "Experiment: %d , ABP_r for bundle: %d \n",i,vaccine; 
  option presolve 0; 
  option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_discrete ); 
  display knitro_options_values_discrete >> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  solve; 
  display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
  { 
   option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_discrete_second_try ); 
   display knitro_options_values_discrete_second_try >> ( "Replication "& 
i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
   solve; 
   display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
   display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets 
&" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  } 
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  ########################### updating the value of d after solving ABP_r for 
bundle b ##################### 
  let {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p], a in A1[b]: b = vaccine} d[a,m] := 
((d[a,m]*l[m])-X[b,m,p])/l[m]; 
  ########################### fixing current variables X and g 
##################### 
  fix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]: b = vaccine} X[b,m,p]; 
  fix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]: b = vaccine} g[p,b]; 
  display solve_result_num >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display X,Y,g >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 } 
 printf "Current antigen demand = \n" >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display d >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Setting up environment TSS_ABP_r to solve ABP_r 
##################### 
 print "############### Setting up environment TSS_ABP_r to solve ABP_r 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 problem TSS_ABP_r; 
 ########################### fixing all variables X and g related with the set 
CV ##################### 
 fix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]: b in CV} X[b,m,p]; 
 fix {p in P, b in B2[p]: b in CV} g[p,b]; 
 #display X,Y,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Initializing loop for all vaccines on monovalent 
vaccines ##################### 
 for {vaccine in MV}  
 { 
  print "############### ABP_r for a specific vaccine ################" >>( 
"Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
  print 
"##############################################################################"; 
  let current_bundle := vaccine; 
  printf "Bundle number = %d \n", vaccine >> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  printf "Current antigen demand = \n" >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display d >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  printf "Experiment: %d , ABP_r for bundle: %d \n",i,vaccine; 
  option presolve 0; 
  option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_discrete ); 
  display knitro_options_values_discrete >> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
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  solve; 
  display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
  { 
   option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_discrete_second_try ); 
   display knitro_options_values_discrete_second_try >> ( "Replication "& 
i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
   solve; 
   display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
   display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets 
&" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt");   
  } 
  ########################### updating the value of d after solving ABP_r for 
bundle b ##################### 
  let {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p], a in A1[b]: b = vaccine} d[a,m] := 
((d[a,m]*l[m])-X[b,m,p])/l[m]; 
  ########################### fixing current variables X and g 
##################### 
  fix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]: b = vaccine} X[b,m,p]; 
  fix {m in M, p in P, b in B2[p]: b = vaccine} g[p,b]; 
  display solve_result_num >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display X,Y,g >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 } 
 printf "Current antigen demand = \n" >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display d >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Setting up environment TP_ABP to determine upper 
bounds on vaccine prices ##################### 
 print 
"##############################################################################"; 
 print "############### Setting up environment TP_ABP to solve ABP_TP solution 
vectors X, g are fixed ################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "TP_ABP"; 
 problem TP_ABP; 
 ########################### Restoring the original value of d 
##################### 
 let {a in A, m in M} d[a,m] := d_original[a,m];  
 ########################### fixing all variables X,g 
############################### 
 fix {m in M, p in P, b in B} X[b,m,p]; 
 fix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #display X,Y,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
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 show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous ); 
 display knitro_options_values_continuous >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 solve; 
 display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
 { 
  option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous_second_try ); 
  display knitro_options_values_continuous_second_try >> ( "Replication "& i 
&" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  solve; 
  display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 }  
 ########################### finding Y_high upperbound for the range of prices 
############################### 
 let {p in P, b in B, m in M} Y_high[b,m,p] := Y[b,m,p]; 
 display solve_result_num >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display X,Y,Y_high,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Setting up environment TP_ABP to determine upper 
bounds on vaccine prices ##################### 
 print 
"##############################################################################"; 
 print "############### Setting up environment TCS_ABP to solve ABP_TCS solution 
vectors X, g are fixed and Y_high is the upper bound for Y ################" >>( 
"Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
 print "TCS_ABP"; 
 problem TCS_ABP; 
 ########################### fixing all variables X,g 
############################### 
 fix {m in M, p in P, b in B} X[b,m,p]; 
 fix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 #display X,Y_high,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous ); 
 display knitro_options_values_continuous >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 solve; 
 display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
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 display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
 { 
  option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous_second_try ); 
  display knitro_options_values_continuous_second_try >> ( "Replication "& i 
&" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  solve; 
  display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 }  
 ########################### finding Y_high upperbound for the range of prices 
############################### 
 let {p in P, b in B, m in M} Y_low[b,m,p] := Y[b,m,p]; 
 display solve_result_num >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display X,Y,Y_low,g >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### Setting up environment ABP for X,g fixed and Y_high 
and Y_low found ############################### 
 print 
"##############################################################################"; 
 print "############### Setting up environment TSS_ABP to solve ABP_TSS solution 
vectors X, g are fixed and Y_high and Y_low are the bounds for Y ################" 
>>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".txt"); 
 print "TSS_ABP"; 
 problem TSS_ABP; 
 ########################### fixing all variables X,g 
############################### 
 fix {m in M, p in P, b in B} X[b,m,p]; 
 fix {p in P, b in B2[p]} g[p,b]; 
 display X,Y_high,Y_low,g >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 show >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 ########################### changing the mip_integral_gap_rel 
############################### 
 option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous_last ); 
 display knitro_options_values_continuous_last >> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 solve; 
 display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
 { 
  printf "\n######################### Start of new infeasible problem 
########################################\n" >> knitro.log; 
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  option knitro_options (  knitro_options_values_continuous_infeasible ); 
  display knitro_options_values_continuous_infeasible >> ( "Replication "& i 
&" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  printf {p in P, b in B2[p], m in M} "Y[%.0f,%.0f,%.0f] = %f\n" 
,b,m,p,Y[b,m,p] >> knitro.log; 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  printf {p in P, b in B2[p], m in M} "X[%.0f,%.0f,%.0f] = %f\n" 
,b,m,p,X[b,m,p] >> knitro.log; 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  printf {p in P, b in B2[p]} "g[%.0f,%.0f] = %f\n" ,p,b,g[p,b] >> 
knitro.log; 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  expand >> knitro.log; 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  solve; 
  printf '\n' >> knitro.log; 
  printf "\nReplication %.0f n_markets %.0f unc_range %.0f interest_rate %.0f 
solve_number %.0f\n",i,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate,solve_result_num  >> 
knitro.log; 
  printf "\n######################### End of infeasible problem 
########################################\n" >> knitro.log; 
  close knitro.log; 
  display _solve_time >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  display solve_message >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 }  
 display solve_result_num >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print "############################### Calculations started 
#################################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets 
&" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  
 ########################### assigning values to parameters of interest 
############################### 
 let TVPC := sum{m in M,p in P, b in B2[p]}X[b,m,p]*Y[b,m,p]; 
 let ANNUITIES := sum{p in P, b in B2[p]} C[b,p]*g[p,b]; 
 let MV := sum{m in M,p in P, b in B2[p]}X[b,m,p]*R[b,m]; 
  
 let {m in M} savings_market[m] := sum{p in P, b in B2[p]}(X[b,m,p]*(R[b,m] - 
Y[b,m,p])); 
 let {m in M} cost_market[m] := sum{p in P, b in B2[p]}X[b,m,p]*Y[b,m,p]; 
  
 let {b in B} surplus_bundle [b] := sum{p in P, m in M} (R[b,m]*X[b,m,p]) - 
sum{p in P: b in B2[p]} C[b,p]*g[p,b]; 
 let {b in B} profit_bundle[b] := sum{p in P, m in M} X[b,m,p]*Y[b,m,p] - sum{p 
in P: b in B2[p]} C[b,p]*g[p,b]; 
 let {b in B} savings_bundle[b] := sum{m in M,p in P: b in B2[p]}(R[b,m]-
Y[b,m,p])*X[b,m,p]; 
 let {b in B} cost_bundle[b] := sum{m in M,p in P: b in B2[p]}X[b,m,p]*Y[b,m,p]; 
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 let {p in P} profit_producer[p] := sum{m in M, b in B2[p]}X[b,m,p]* Y[b,m,p] - 
sum{b in B2[p]}C[b,p]*g[p,b]; 
  
 let {m in M , b in B} savings_market_bundle[m,b] := (sum{p in 
P}(X[b,m,p]*(R[b,m] - Y[b,m,p]))); 
 let {p in P , b in B2[p]} profit_producer_bundle[p,b] := (sum{m in M}(X[b,m,p]* 
Y[b,m,p]) - C[b,p]*g[p,b]); 
  
 let {m in M} cost_per_child[m] := cost_market[m]/l[m]; 
 let {m in M} savings_per_child[m] := savings_market[m]/l[m]; 
 
 if n_markets = 2 then  
 {   
  let {c in COUNTRIES, m in M: GNI_low_2[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_2[m]} countries2[c,m]:=1; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} cost_per_country[c] := sum{m in 
M}cost_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries2[c,m]; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} savings_per_country[c] := sum{m in M}sav-
ings_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries2[c,m]; 
 } 
 if n_markets = 4 then  
 {  
  let {c in COUNTRIES, m in M: GNI_low_4[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_4[m]} countries4[c,m]:=1; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} cost_per_country[c] := sum{m in 
M}cost_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries4[c,m]; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} savings_per_country[c] := sum{m in M}sav-
ings_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries4[c,m]; 
 } 
 if n_markets = 8 then  
 {  
  let {c in COUNTRIES, m in M: GNI_low_8[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_8[m]} countries8[c,m]:=1; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} cost_per_country[c] := sum{m in 
M}cost_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries8[c,m]; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} savings_per_country[c] := sum{m in M}sav-
ings_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries8[c,m]; 
 } 
 if n_markets = 12 then  
 {  
  let {c in COUNTRIES, m in M: GNI_low_12[m] < GNI_country[c] <= 
GNI_high_12[m]} countries12[c,m]:=1; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} cost_per_country[c] := sum{m in 
M}cost_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries12[c,m]; 
  let {c in COUNTRIES} savings_per_country[c] := sum{m in M}sav-
ings_per_child[m]*annual_births[c]*countries12[c,m]; 
 } 
  
  
 let Cost_LIC := sum{c in (LMIC union LIC)} cost_per_country[c]; 
 let Savings_LIC := sum{c in (LMIC union LIC)} savings_per_country[c]; 
 let Cost_HIC := sum{c in (UMIC union HIC)} cost_per_country[c]; 
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 let Savings_HIC := sum{c in (UMIC union HIC)} savings_per_country[c];  
 let total_time := _total_solve_time - current_time; 
  
 print "############### Calculations done ################" >>( "Replication "& 
i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 option omit_zero_rows 0; 
 option display_round 6; 
 ######################### printing metrics to the csv file 
##################################### 
 print "############### writing metrics file ################" >>( "Replication 
"& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  
  
 if i = 1 then let title := 'True';  
 if title = 'True' then  
 {    
  printf "Experiment,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate,ROI,num_y,to-
tal_time,feasible_num,MV,TSS,TP,TCS,TVPC,ANNUITIES,Cost_LIC,Cost_HIC,Sav-
ings_LIC,Savings_HIC,TSS/MV,TP/MV,TCS/MV,TVPC/MV,ANNUI-
TIES/MV,Cost_LIC/MV,Cost_HIC/MV,Savings_LIC/MV,Savings_HIC/MV" >> ( "Metrics for 
m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&" .csv"); 
  printf "\n" >> ( "Metrics for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& in-
terest_rate&" .csv"); 
  printf "Experiment,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate,bundle,market,pro-
ducer,X,Y_low,Y,Y_high" >> ( "Vectors for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".csv"); 
  printf "\n" >> ( "Vectors for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& in-
terest_rate&".csv");  
  printf "Experiment,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate," >> ( "Countries for 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".csv");  
  printf {c in COUNTRIES} "%.0f,",c >> ( "Countries for m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".csv");   
  printf "\n" >> ( "Countries for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".csv");  
  let title := 'False'; 
 } 
 if match(solve_message,'optimal') = 0 then  
 { 
  let feasible := "FALSE"; 
  printf "%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.2f,%.0f,%f,%f,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",i,n_mar-
kets,unc_range,interest_rate,ROI,num_y,total_time,solve_result_num >> ( "Metrics 
for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&" .csv"); 
  printf "\n" >> ( "Metrics for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& in-
terest_rate&" .csv"); 
 } else  
 { 
  let feasible:= "TRUE"; 
  printf 
"%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.2f,%.0f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%
f,%f,%f,%f",i,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate,ROI,num_y,total_time,solve_re-
sult_num,MV,TSS,TP,TCS,TVPC,ANNUITIES,Cost_LIC,Cost_HIC,Savings_LIC,Sav-
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ings_HIC,TSS/MV,TP/MV,TCS/MV,TVPC/MV,ANNUITIES/MV,Cost_LIC/MV,Cost_HIC/MV,Sav-
ings_LIC/MV,Savings_HIC/MV >> ( "Metrics for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&" .csv"); 
  printf "\n" >> ( "Metrics for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& in-
terest_rate&" .csv"); 
  printf {b in B, p in P, m in 
M}"%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%f,%f,%f,%f\n" ,i,n_markets,unc_range,inter-
est_rate,b,m,p,X[b,m,p],Y_low[b,m,p],Y[b,m,p],Y_high[b,m,p] >> ( "Vectors for m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".csv");   
  printf "%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,%.0f,", i,n_markets,unc_range,interest_rate >> ( 
"Countries for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".csv"); 
  
  printf {c in COUNTRIES} "%f,",cost_per_country[c] >> ( "Countries for m="& 
n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".csv");   
  printf "\n" >> ( "Countries for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".csv");  
  let feasible_experiments := feasible_experiments + 1; 
 } 
  
 close ( "Metrics for m="& n_markets & " n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&" 
.csv"); 
 close ( "Vectors for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".csv"); 
 close ( "Countries for m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& inter-
est_rate&".csv");   
 
 print "############### printing parameters, solution vectors and metrics 
################" >>( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range 
&" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 
 let total_time := _total_solve_time - current_time; 
 display current_time >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display _total_solve_time >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display total_time >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& 
unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
  
 display i,interest_rate,ROI,unc_range,num_y,n_markets,total_time,feasi-
ble,MV,TSS,TP,TCS,TVPC,ANNUITIES,Cost_LIC,Cost_HIC,Savings_LIC,Savings_HIC,Sav-
ings_LIC/MV,Savings_HIC/MV,TP/MV,ANNUITIES/MV >> ( "Replication "& i &" process 
m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display {b in B} (surplus_bundle[b],profit_bundle[b],savings_bun-
dle[b],cost_bundle[b],annuity[b]) >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets 
&" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display {m in M} (savings_market[m],savings_market[m]/l[m],cost_mar-
ket[m],cost_market[m]/l[m]) >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display {m in M, b in B} (savings_market_bundle[m,b],savings_market_bun-
dle[m,b]/TCS) >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
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 display {p in P} (profit_producer[p],profit_producer[p]/TP) >> ( "Replication 
"& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display {p in P , b in B2[p]} (profit_producer_bundle[p,b],profit_producer_bun-
dle[p,b]/TP) >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" 
i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 display X,Y_low,Y,Y_high,g >> ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" 
n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
      
  
 print "############### end of file ################" >>( "Replication "& i &" 
process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& interest_rate&".txt"); 
 close ( "Replication "& i &" process m="& n_markets &" n="& unc_range &" i="& 
interest_rate&".txt"); 
 print 
"##################################################################################
##################"; 
 printf "######################################## Results for experiment %d 
#################################\n",i; 
 print 
"##################################################################################
##################"; 
 let i := i + 1; 
 
} until feasible_experiments == feasible_required or i == num_experiments_to + 1; 
} 
} 
print 
"##################################################################################
##################"; 
print "######################################## All the experiments have run 
#################################"; 
print 
"##################################################################################
##################"; 
 
/* 
######################################################### 
######################################################### 
 
# Meaning of the Knitro and AMPL options 
 
######################################################### 
######################################################### 
 
###################################################################################
###################### 
################################# list of available Knitro_options 
###################################### 
alg                   Algorithm (0=auto, 1=direct, 2=cg, 3=active, 4=sqp, 5=multi) 
algorithm             Algorithm (0=auto, 1=direct, 2=cg, 3=active, 4=sqp, 5=multi) 
bar_directinterval    Frequency for trying to force direct steps 
bar_feasible          Emphasize feasibility 
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bar_feasmodetol       Tolerance for entering stay feasible mode 
bar_initmu            Initial value for barrier parameter 
bar_initpt            Barrier initial point strategy for slacks/multipliers 
bar_maxbacktrack      Maximum number of linesearch backtracks 
bar_maxcrossit        Maximum number of crossover iterations 
bar_maxrefactor       Maximum number of KKT refactorizations allowed 
bar_murule            Rule for updating the barrier parameter 
bar_penaltycons       Apply penalty method to constraints 
bar_penaltyrule       Rule for updating the penalty parameter 
bar_refinement        Whether to refine barrier solution 
bar_relaxcons         Whether to relax constraints 
bar_switchrule        Rule for barrier switching alg 
blasoption            Which BLAS/LAPACK library to use 
blasoptionlib         Name of dynamic BLAS/LAPACK library 
cplexlibname          Name of dynamic CPLEX library 
debug                 Debugging level (0=none, 1=problem, 2=execution) 
delta                 Initial trust region radius 
derivcheck            Whether to use derivative checker 
derivcheck_tol        Relative tolerance for derivative checker 
derivcheck_type       Derivative checker type (1=forward, 2=central) 
feastol               Feasibility stopping tolerance 
feastol_abs           Absolute feasibility tolerance 
feastolabs            Absolute feasibility tolerance 
gradopt               Gradient computation method 
hessopt               Hessian computation method 
honorbnds             Enforce satisfaction of the bounds 
infeastol             Infeasibility stopping tolerance 
linsolver             Which linear solver to use 
linsolver_ooc         Use out-of-core option? 
lmsize                Number of limited-memory pairs stored for LBFGS 
lpsolver              LP solver used by Active Set algorithm 
ma_maxtime_cpu        Maximum CPU time when 'alg=multi', in seconds 
ma_maxtime_real       Maximum real time when 'alg=multi', in seconds 
ma_outsub             Enable subproblem output when 'alg=multi' 
ma_terminate          Termination condition when option 'alg=multi' 
maxcgit               Maximum number of conjugate gradient iterations 
maxit                 Maximum number of iterations 
maxtime_cpu           Maximum CPU time in seconds, per start point 
maxtime_real          Maximum real time in seconds, per start point 
mip_branchrule        MIP branching rule 
mip_debug             MIP debugging level (0=none, 1=all) 
mip_gub_branch        Branch on GUBs (0=no, 1=yes) 
mip_heuristic         MIP heuristic search 
mip_heuristic_maxit   MIP heuristic iteration limit 
mip_implications      Add logical implications (0=no, 1=yes) 
mip_integer_tol       Threshold for deciding integrality 
mip_integral_gap_abs  Absolute integrality gap stop tolerance 
mip_integral_gap_rel  Relative integrality gap stop tolerance 
mip_knapsack          Add knapsack cuts (0=no, 1=ineqs, 2=ineqs+eqs) 
mip_lpalg             LP subproblem algorithm 
mip_maxnodes          Maximum nodes explored 
mip_maxsolves         Maximum subproblem solves 
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mip_maxtime_cpu       Maximum CPU time in seconds for MIP 
mip_maxtime_real      Maximum real in seconds time for MIP 
mip_method            MIP method (0=auto, 1=BB, 2=HQG) 
mip_outinterval       MIP output interval 
mip_outlevel          MIP output level 
mip_outsub            Enable MIP subproblem output 
mip_pseudoinit        Pseudo-cost initialization 
mip_rootalg           Root node relaxation algorithm 
mip_rounding          MIP rounding rule 
mip_selectrule        MIP node selection rule 
mip_strong_candlim    Strong branching candidate limit 
mip_strong_level      Strong branching tree level limit 
mip_strong_maxit      Strong branching iteration limit 
mip_terminate         Termination condition for MIP 
ms_deterministic      Use deterministic multistart 
ms_enable             Enable multistart 
ms_maxbndrange        Maximum unbounded variable range for multistart 
ms_maxsolves          Maximum KNITRO solves for multistart 
ms_maxtime_cpu        Maximum CPU time for multistart, in seconds 
ms_maxtime_real       Maximum real time for multistart, in seconds 
ms_num_to_save        Feasible points to save from multistart 
ms_outsub             Enable subproblem output for parallel multistart 
ms_savetol            Tol for feasible points being equal 
ms_seed               Seed for multistart random generator 
ms_startptrange       Maximum variable range for multistart 
ms_terminate          Termination condition for multistart 
newpoint              Use newpoint feature 
objno                 objective number: 0 = none, 1 = first (default), 
                      2 = second (if _nobjs > 1), etc. 
objrange              Objective range 
objrep                Whether to replace 
                        minimize obj: v; 
                      with 
                        minimize obj: f(x) 
                      when variable v appears linearly 
                      in exactly one constraint of the form 
                        s.t. c: v >= f(x); 
                      or 
                        s.t. c: v == f(x); 
                      Possible objrep values: 
                      0 = no 
                      1 = yes for v >= f(x) (default) 
                      2 = yes for v == f(x) 
                      3 = yes in both cases 
optionsfile           Name/location of KNITRO options file if provided 
opttol                Optimality stopping tolerance 
opttol_abs            Absolute optimality tolerance 
opttolabs             Absolute optimality tolerance 
outappend             Append to output files (0=no, 1=yes) 
outdir                Directory for output files 
outlev                Control printing level 
outmode               Where to direct output (0=screen, 1=file, 2=both) 
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par_blasnumthreads    Number of parallel threads for BLAS 
par_lsnumthreads      Number of parallel threads for linear solver 
par_numthreads        Number of parallel threads 
pivot                 Initial pivot tolerance 
presolve              KNITRO presolver level 
presolve_dbg          KNITRO presolver debugging level 
presolve_tol          KNITRO presolver tolerance 
qpcheck               whether to check for a QP: 0 = no, 1 (default) = yes 
relax                 whether to ignore integrality: 0 (default) = no, 1 = yes 
scale                 Automatic scaling option 
soc                   Second order correction options 
timing                Whether to report problem I/O and solve times: 
                        0 (default) = no 
                        1 = yes, on stdout 
tuner                 Enables KNITRO Tuner 
tuner_maxtime_cpu     Maximum CPU time when 'tuner=on', in seconds 
tuner_maxtime_real    Maximum real time when 'tuner=on', in seconds 
tuner_optionsfile     Name/location of Tuner options file if provided 
tuner_outsub          Enable subproblem output when 'tuner=on' 
tuner_terminate       Termination condition when 'tuner=on' 
version               Report software version 
wantsol               solution report without -AMPL: sum of 
                        1 ==> write .sol file 
                        2 ==> print primal variable values 
                        4 ==> print dual variable values 
                        8 ==> do not print solution message 
xpresslibname         Name of dynamic Xpress library 
xtol                  Stepsize stopping tolerance 
################################# list of available Knitro_options 
###################################### 
###################################################################################
###################### 
 
###################################################################################
###################### 
########################################## Knitro_options 
############################################### 
algorithm             Algorithm (0=auto, 1=direct, 2=cg, 3=active, 4=sqp, 5=multi) 
      Indicates which algorithm to use to solve the problem 
      0 (auto) let KNITRO automatically choose an algorithm, based 
on the problem characteristics. 
      1 (direct) use the Interior/Direct algorithm. 
      2 (cg) use the Interior/CG algorithm. 
      3 (active) use the Active Set algorithm. 
      4 (sqp) use the SQP algorithm. 
      5 (multi) run all algorithms, perhaps in parallel (see Algo-
rithms). 
      Default value: 0 
 
bar_feasible 
      Specifies whether special emphasis is placed on getting and 
staying feasible in the interior-point algorithms. 
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      •0 (no) No special emphasis on feasibility. 
      •1 (stay) Iterates must satisfy inequality constraints once 
they become sufficiently feasible. 
      •2 (get) Special emphasis is placed on getting feasible be-
fore trying to optimize. 
      •3 (get_stay) Implement both options 1 and 2 above. 
      Default value: 0 
      Note: This option can only be used with the Interior/Direct 
and Interior/CG algorithms. 
 
bar_feasmodetol 
      Specifies the tolerance in equation that determines whether 
KNITRO will force subsequent iterates to remain 
      feasible. 
      The tolerance applies to all inequality constraints in the 
problem. This option only has an effect if option 
      bar_feasible = stay or bar_feasible = get_stay. 
      Default value: 1.0e-4 
 
feastol               Feasibility stopping tolerance 
      Specifies the final relative stopping tolerance for the fea-
sibility error. 
      Smaller values of feastol result in a higher degree of accu-
racy in the solution with respect to feasibility. 
      Default value: 1.0e-6 
 
feastol_abs (or feastolabs)         Absolute feasibility tolerance 
      Specifies the final absolute stopping tolerance for the fea-
sibility error. Smaller values of feastol_abs result 
      in a higher degree of accuracy in the solution with respect 
to feasibility. 
      Default value: 1.0e-3 
 
infeastol             Infeasibility stopping tolerance 
      Specifies the (relative) tolerance used for declaring infea-
sibility of a model. 
      Smaller values of infeastol make it more difficult to sat-
isfy the conditions KNITRO uses for detecting 
      infeasible models. If you believe KNITRO incorrectly de-
clares a model to be infeasible, then you should try a 
      smaller value for infeastol. 
      Default value: 1.0e-8 
       
ma_maxtime_cpu        Maximum CPU time when 'alg=multi', in seconds 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable CPU time before 
termination for the multi-algorithm (alg=5) 
      procedure (alg=5). Default value: 1.0e8 
 
ma_maxtime_real       Maximum real time when 'alg=multi', in seconds 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable real time be-
fore termination for the multi-algorithm (alg=5) 
      procedure (alg=5). 
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      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
ma_outsub             Enable subproblem output when 'alg=multi' 
      Enable writing algorithm output to files for the multi-algo-
rithm (alg=5) procedure. 
      0 Do not write detailed algorithm output to files. 
      1 Write detailed algorithm output to files named 
knitro_ma_*.log 
      Default value: 0 
 
ma_terminate          Termination condition when option 'alg=multi' 
      Define the termination condition for the multi-algorithm 
(alg=5) procedure. 
      0 Terminate after all algorithms have completed. 
      1 Terminate at first locally optimal solution. 
      2 Terminate at first feasible solution estimate. 
      3 Terminate at first solution estimate of any type. 
      Default value: 1 
 
maxit      Specifies the maximum number of iterations before termination. 
      0 Let KNITRO automatically choose a value based on the prob-
lem type. Currently KNITRO sets this value 
      to 10000 for LPs/NLPs and 3000 for MIP problems. 
      n At most n>0 iterations may be performed before terminat-
ing. 
      Default value: 0 
 
maxtime_cpu 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable CPU time before 
termination. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
maxtime_real 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable real time be-
fore termination. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
mip_integer_tol 
      This value Specifies the threshold for deciding whether or 
not a variable is determined to be an integer. 
      Default value: 1.0e-8 
 
mip_integral_gap_abs 
      The absolute integrality gap stop tolerance for MIP. 
      Default value: 1.0e-6 
 
mip_integral_gap_rel 
      The relative integrality gap stop tolerance for MIP. 
      Default value: 1.0e-6 
 
mip_maxnodes          Maximum nodes explored 
      Specifies the maximum number of nodes explored (0 means no 
limit). 
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      Default value: 100000 
 
mip_maxsolves         Maximum subproblem solves 
      Specifies the maximum number of subproblem solves allowed (0 
means no limit). 
      Default value: 200000 
mip_maxtime_cpu 
      Specifies the maximum allowable CPU time in seconds for the 
complete MIP solution. 
      Use maxtime_cpu to additionally limit time spent per sub-
problem solve. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
mip_maxtime_real 
      Specifies the maximum allowable real time in seconds for the 
complete MIP solution. 
      Use maxtime_real to additionally limit time spent per sub-
problem solve. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
mip_outlevel 
      Specifies how much MIP information to print. 
      0 (none) Do not print any MIP node information. 
      1 (iters) Print one line of output for every node. 
      2 (iterstime) Also print accumulated time for every node. 
      Default value: 1 
 
mip_terminate         Termination condition for MIP 
      Specifies conditions for terminating the MIP algorithm. 
      0 (optimal) Terminate at optimum. 
      1 (feasible) Terminate at first integer feasible point. 
      Default value: 0 
 
ms_enable             Enable multistart 
      Indicates whether KNITRO will solve from multiple start 
points to find a better local minimum. 
      0 (no) KNITRO solves from a single initial point. 
      1 (yes) KNITRO solves using multiple start points. 
      Default value: 0 
       
ms_maxbndrange        Maximum unbounded variable range for multistart Specifies the 
maximum range that an unbounded variable  
      can take when determining new start points. If a variable is 
unbounded in one or both directions,  
      then new start point values are restricted by the option. If 
x_i is such a variable, then all initial  
      values satisfy max{biL , xoi - ms_maxbndrange}/2}<= xi <- 
min{biU , xoi + ms_maxbndrange}/2} 
      where xoi is the initial value of xi provided by the user, 
and biL and biU are the variable bounds (possibly  
      infinite) on x_i. This option has no effect unless ms_enable 
= yes. Default value: 1000.0 
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ms_maxsolves          Maximum KNITRO solves for multistart 
      Specifies how many start points to try in multi-start. This 
option has no effect unless ms_enable = yes. 
      0 Let KNITRO automatically choose a value based on the prob-
lem size. The value is min(200, 10 N), 
      where N is the number of variables in the problem. 
      n Try n>0 start points. 
      Default value: 0 
 
ms_maxtime_cpu        Maximum CPU time for multistart, in seconds 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable CPU time before 
termination. 
      The limit applies to the operation of KNITRO since multi-
start began; in contrast, the value of maxtime_cpu 
      limits how long KNITRO iterates from a single start point. 
Therefore, ms_maxtime_cpu should be greater 
      than maxtime_cpu. This option has no effect unless ms_enable 
= yes. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
ms_maxtime_real       Maximum real time for multistart, in seconds 
      Specifies, in seconds, the maximum allowable real time be-
fore termination. 
      The limit applies to the operation of KNITRO since multi-
start began; in contrast, the value of maxtime_real 
      limits how long KNITRO iterates from a single start point. 
Therefore, ms_maxtime_real should be greater 
      than maxtime_real. This option has no effect unless ms_ena-
ble = yes. 
      Default value: 1.0e8 
 
ms_outsub             Enable subproblem output for parallel multistart 
      Enable writing algorithm output to files for the parallel 
multistart procedure. 
      0 Do not write detailed algorithm output to files. 
      1 Write detailed algorithm output to files named knitro_ms_ 
      Default value: 0 
 
ms_seed               Seed for multistart random generator 
      Seed value used to generate random initial points in multi-
start; should be a non-negative integer. 
      Default value: 0 
 
ms_terminate          Termination condition for multistart 
      Specifies the condition for terminating multi-start. 
      This option has no effect unless ms_enable = yes. 
      0 Terminate after ms_maxsolves. 
      1 Terminate after the first local optimal solution is found 
or ms_maxsolves, whichever comes first. 
      2 Terminate after the first feasible solution estimate is 
found or ms_maxsolves, whichever comes first. 
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      3 Terminate after the first solution estimate of any type is 
found or ms_maxsolves, whichever comes first. 
      Default value: 0 
 
optionsfile           Name/location of KNITRO options file if provided 
 
opttol                Optimality stopping tolerance 
      Specifies the final relative stopping tolerance for the KKT 
(optimality) error. 
      Smaller values of opttol result in a higher degree of accu-
racy in the solution with respect to optimality. 
      Default value: 1.0e-6 
 
opttol_abs            Absolute optimality tolerance 
      Specifies the final absolute stopping tolerance for the KKT 
(optimality) error. 
      Smaller values of opttol_abs result in a higher degree of 
accuracy in the solution with respect to optimality. 
      Default value: 1.0e-3 
       
opttolabs             Absolute optimality tolerance 
 
outlev                Control printing level 
      Controls the level of output produced by KNITRO. 
      0 (none) Printing of all output is suppressed. 
      1 (summary) Print only summary information. 
      2 (iter_10) Print basic information every 10 iterations. 
      3 (iter) Print basic information at each iteration. 
      4 (iter_verbose) Print basic information and the function 
count at each iteration. 
      5 (iter_x) Print all the above, and the values of the solu-
tion vector x. 
      6 (all) Print all the above, and the values of the con-
straints c at x and the Lagrange multipliers lambda. 
      Default value: 2 
       
outmode               Where to direct output (0=screen, 1=file, 2=both) 
      Specifies where to direct the output from KNITRO. 
      0 (screen) Output is directed to standard out (e.g., 
screen). 
      1 (file) Output is sent to a file named knitro.log. 
      2 (both) Output is directed to both the screen and file 
knitro.log. 
      Default value: 0 
 
presolve              KNITRO presolver level 
      Determine whether or not to use the KNITRO presolver to try 
to simplify the model by removing variables or 
      constraints. 
      0 (none) Do not use KNITRO presolver. 
      1 (basic) Use the KNITRO basic presolver. 
      Default value: 1 
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presolve_dbg          KNITRO presolver debugging level 
      0 no debugging information 
      2 print the KNITRO problem with AMPL model names 
 
presolve_tol          KNITRO presolver tolerance 
      Determines the tolerance used by the KNITRO presolver to re-
move variables and constraints from the model. 
      If you believe the KNITRO presolver is incorrectly modifying 
the model, use a smaller value for this tolerance 
      (or turn the presolver off). 
      Default value: 1.0e-6 
       
version               Report software version 
 
xtol                  Stepsize stopping tolerance 
      The optimization process will terminate if the relative 
change in all components of the solution point estimate 
      is less than xtol. If using the Interior/Direct or Inte-
rior/CG algorithm and the barrier parameter is still large, 
      KNITRO will first try decreasing the barrier parameter be-
fore terminating. 
      Default value: 1.0e-15 
 
########################################## Knitro_options 
############################################### 
###################################################################################
###################### 
Return codes numbers 
0: the final solution satisfies the termination conditions for verifying optimal-
ity. 
-100 to -199: a feasible approximate solution was found. 
-200 to -299: KNITRO terminated at an infeasible point. 
-300: the problem was determined to be unbounded. 
-400 to -499: KNITRO terminated because it reached a pre-defined limit (-40x codes 
indicate that a feasible 
point was found before reaching the limit, while -41x codes indicate that no feasi-
ble point was found before 
reaching the limit). 
-500 to -599: KNITRO terminated with an input error or some non-standard error. 
########################################## Knitro_options 
############################################### 
###################################################################################
###################### 
 
###################################################################################
###################### 
##################################### AMPL presolver options 
############################################ 
 
 option presolve_eps  8e-5;  Differences between the lower and upper bound are 
ignored  
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        when they are less than this value 
 option presolve_fixeps 8e-5;Thus whenever the upper bound minus the lower bound  
        on a variable or constraint body is positive 
        but less than the value of option presolve_fixeps,  
        the variable or constraint body is fixed at the aver-
age   
        of the two bounds. If increasing the value of  
        presolve_fixeps to at most the value of pre-
solve_fixepsmax  
        would change the results of presolve, a message to 
this  
        effect is displayed. 
 option presolve_epsmax 10e-5; Due to imprecision in the computations, the lower 
bound  
        may come out slightly greater than the upper bound,  
        causing AMPL’s presolve to report an infeasible prob-
lem.  
        To circumvent this difficulty, you can reset the op-
tion   
        presolve_eps from its default value of 0 to some 
small  
        positive value. 
 option presolve 0;   To turn off presolve entirely, set option presolve to 
0;  
        to turn off the second part only, set it to 1. A 
higher  
        value for this option indicates the maximum number of  
        passes made in part two of presolve; the default is 
10. 
 option display_round 3;  n causes the display command to round numeric 
values to n 
        places past the decimal point (or to - n places be-
fore  
        the decimal point if n < 0). 
 option display_eps 1e-07; display_eps affect only the appearance of numbers,  
        not their actual values. 
 
#option presolve_eps  8e-5;   
#option presolve_fixeps 8e-5; 
#option presolve_epsmax 10e-5; 
#option presolve_fixepsmax 10e-5; 
 
##################################### AMPL presolver options 
############################################ 
###################################################################################
###################### 
*/ 
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